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State-Defined Marital Status: Its Future
as an Operative Tax Factor
Daniel J. Lathrope*
Certainly the tax-minded young man and woman, whose relative in-
comes place them in the disfavored group, will seriously consider cohabita-
tion without marriage. Thereby they can enjoy the blessings of love while
minimizing their forced contribution to the federal fsc. They can synthesize
the forces of love and selfishness.'
INTRODUCTION
Marital status has a significant impact upon an individual's federal
income tax liability.2 Filing status, personal exemptions, exclusions, de-
ductions, and tax credits are affected by whether a taxpayer is single or
married.' The economic relationship between married individuals has
been the basis for the role marital status plays as an operative tax fac-
tor." For example, since most married couples operate as a single eco-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. B.S.B.A. 1973, University of Denver; J.D. 1977, Northwestern University;
LL.M. (Taxation) 1979, New York University.
Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978).
2 Marital status also plays a significant role in the operation of the federal estate and
gift taxes. E.g., I.R.C. § 2040 (estate tax consequences of qualified joint interests);
I.R.C. § 2056 (estate tax marital deduction); I.R.C. § 2523 (gift tax marital deduction).
The observations and conclusions in this Article concerning the interrelationship be-
tween the federal income tax and state-defined marital status are equally applicable to
the federal estate and gift taxes. For a discussion of possible estate and gift tax savings
from marriage or a "marriage in contemplation of death," see Wenig, Marital Status
and Taxes 241-47 in G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW (1979).
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE INCOME
TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 8-15 (Comm. Print
1980) thereafter 1980 JOINT COMM. PRINT). It has been estimated that more than 40
sections of the Internal Revenue Code are affected by marital status. G. DOUTHWAITE,
supra note 2, at 191 & n.6.
' See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1392-95 (1975); McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Personal Income Tax: Pro-
legomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C.L. REV. 469, 469-71 (1980). The Supreme
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nomic unit, the income tax treats spouses as a single taxpaying unit
whose tax liability is dependent upon its total taxable income.' The
Internal Revenue Code (Code) also recognizes spouses' near identity of
interest when dealing with one another and subjects intramarital trans-
actions to special scrutiny.6 Attribution rules frequently require taxpay-
ers to be treated as the constructive owners of interests owned by their
spouses when determining the tax consequences of transactions.7
Court, in applying the predecessor of I.R.C. § 267 to disallow losses reported by a
married couple, noted:
Section 24(b) states an absolute prohibition - not a presumption -
against the allowance of losses on any sales between the members of cer-
tain designated groups. The one common characteristic of these groups is
that their members, although distinct legal entities, generally have a near-
identity of economic interests. It is a fair inference that even legally genu-
ine intra-group transfers were not thought to result, usually, in economi-
cally genuine realization of loss, and accordingly that Congress did not
deem them to be appropriate occasions for the allowance of deductions.
McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 699 (1947) (footnote omitted).
' Married taxpayers are generally permitted to file joint returns in which they ag-
gregate their income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits. I.R.C. § 6013. Although
married couples may elect to file separately, the rate tables are structured so that sepa-
rate filing almost always results in increased tax liability. The rates applied to married
taxpayers filing separate returns are the same as the rates applied to married taxpayers
filing jointly with exactly twice as much taxable income. In 1983, a married taxpayer
filing separately with $30,000 of taxable income will pay $8,007 of tax and will reach
the 44% marginal tax rate. A married couple filing jointly in the same year with
$60,000 of taxable income will pay $16,014 of tax and also will reach the 44% margi-
nal bracket. I.R.C. § 1(a), (d). Joint filing allows a married couple to split, in effect,
their total income and obtain the benefit of lower marginal tax rates. As a result, it is
estimated that only 1.3% of married couples file separately. Couples who file separately
often do so for reasons of privacy, because the relationship has broken down, or to
avoid joint and several liability with respect to the return. 1980 JOINT COMM. PRINT,
supra note 3, at 9, 48.
' E.g., I.R.C. § 267(a), (b)(1), (c)(4) (disallowance of losses from sales or exchanges
and deductions for unpaid expenses and interest between taxpayers and their spouses);
I.R.C. § 453(e), (f)(1) (elimination of the benefits of the installment method for sales
between taxpayers and their spouses if the spouse disposes of the property before the
taxpayer receives all payments attributable to the original sale); I.R.C. § 1239(a),
(b)(1) (characterization of gain as ordinary income in the case of sales or exchanges of
property between spouses if the property is depreciable in the hands of the transferee).
' For example, shareholders are frequently considered to own their spouses' stock in
a corporation for purposes of determining the tax consequences of transactions between
shareholders and the corporation. E.g., I.R.C. § 267(a), (b)(2), (c)(4) (attribution for
purposes of disallowing losses on sales or exchanges and deductions for unpaid ex-
penses and interest between an individual and a corporation more than 50% in value
owned by the individual); I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (attribution for purposes of provisions in
subchapter C of the Code which expressly make § 318 applicable); I.R.C. § 341(e)
Marriage and Tax
Marital status, however, is both overinclusive and underinclusive as
an indicator of economic circumstances Married couples may separate
or spouses may choose to arrange their relationship in a manner which
retains their economic independence. Also, other family and nonmarital
relationships may embrace financial and economic ties similar to those
in marriage. The Code acknowledges the community of interest which
exists in many nonmarital familial relationships. Reduced tax rates are
provided for single taxpayers with familial or quasi-familial obligations
and attribution rules frequently require that a taxpayer be deemed the
owner of interests owned by various relatives.' However, tax distinc-
(attribution for purposes of testing certain exceptions to classification of a corporation
as "collapsible"); I.R.C. § 544(a)(2) (attribution for purposes of testing whether a cor-
poration is a personal holding company). Also, partners are considered to own their
spouses' interests in partnership capital or profits when determining the tax results of
transactions between the partner and the partnership. I.R.C. § 707(b)(3).
There is a split of authority concerning whether attribution may be disregarded
when there is evidence of actual family hostility. Compare Robin Haft Trust v. Com-
missioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975) (family discord may preclude rigid application
of the § 318 attribution rules in determining whether a redemption qualifies as an
exchange under § 302(b)(1)), vacating and remanding 62 T.C. 145 (1974) with
Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974) (attribution under § 318 for § 304
purposes is not affected by family hostility), affd per curiam, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); David Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42
(1981) (in dictum, a majority of the Tax Court indicated that family hostility may be
considered in applying § 302(b)(1) if there is some reduction in the redeemed share-
holder's actual and constructive ownership interest in the corporation), affd, 693 F.2d
459 (5th Cir. 1982) (Fifth Circuit rejected the view that family hostility may mitigate
attribution), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537 (1983); David Miller v. Commissioner, 75
T.C. 182 (1980) (family hostility has no effect on the application of the § 267 attribu-
tion rules); Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66 (the I.R.S. will not follow the First Cir-
cuit's decision in Robin Haft Trust).
' Constitutional challenges to marriage-based tax distinctions have, however, been
unsuccessful. The marriage penalty has been sustained against various constitutional
challenges. Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2429 (1983); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), affd
per curiam sub nom. Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978); Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978). Also, constitutional challenges to the lower rates pro-
vided in § 1 for married taxpayers have been rejected. Faraco v. Commissioner, 261
F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 925 (1959); Kellems v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 556 (1972), affd per curiam, 474 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
831 (1973).
' The Code permits a head of household to use rate tables that are more favorable
than those applicable to other single taxpayers. Compare I.R.C. § l(b) with I.R.C. §
1(c). To qualify as a "head of household," a taxpayer must be single (not a surviving
spouse) and either (1) maintain as the taxpayer's home a household which constitutes
19831
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tions based upon family relationships, such as marriage, are applied
with rigidity. The economic sharing which may exist in quasi-marital
relationships is ignored. While total marital breakdowns may have tax
significance, married taxpayers who are living apart or who maintain
their economic independence are still married for tax purposes."
Federal tax law does not define marital status. Instead the tax law,
in a majority of situations, defers to local law determinations of marital
status," recognizing the substantial interests and expertise of the states
the principal place of abode for an individual who is either a designated family member
or a dependent of the taxpayer for whom the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction under
§ 151 of the Code, or (2) maintain a household which is the principal abode of one of
the taxpayer's parents if the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction under § 151 for that
parent. I.R.C. § 2(b). Also, the Code's attribution rules recognize the community of
interest in many familial relationships. E.g., I.R.C. § 267(c)(4) (attribution to the tax-
payer of interests owned by spouses, brothers, sisters, ancestors, and lineal descend-
ants); I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (attribution to the taxpayer from children, grandchildren, and
parents); I.R.C. § 707(b)(3) (adopting the family attribution rules in § 267(c) of the
Code for purposes of determining the tax consequences of certain transactions between
a partner and a partnership or between two commonly controlled partnerships).
10 Married taxpayers who are legally separated under a decree of divorce or of sepa-
rate maintenance are not considered married for tax purposes. E.g., I.R.C. §§
143(a)(2), 6013(d)(2). Additionally, for purposes of filing a head of household return
and determining personal exemptions, individuals are considered single if an individual
is (1) married, (2) files a separate return, (3) maintains as the individual's home a
household which constitutes the principal place of abode for more than one-half of the
year of a dependent child or stepchild, (4) furnishes over one-half of the cost of main-
taining the household during the year, and (5) during the entire year the individual's
spouse is not a member of the household. I.R.C. §§ 2(c), 143(b). Section 44A, which
allows a credit for certain household and dependent care services necessary for gainful
employment, adopts a standard similar to § 143(b) to permit a married taxpayer to
claim the credit despite filing separately. I.R.C. § 44A(O(4). The credit for the elderly
may be claimed by a married taxpayer even though a joint return was not filed if the
couple lived apart at all times during the taxable year. I.R.C. § 37(d)(1).
" E.g., Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 361 (1978) (temporary order for support by
Wisconsin court did not constitute a legal separation under § 143(a)(2), so the taxpayer
was still married and could not file as a single person), affd, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.
1979); Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 540 (1975) (New York declara-
tory judgment validating prior Mexican divorce recognized for purposes of determining
who qualified as a surviving spouse in applying the estate tax marital deduction), affd,
539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lipkowitz v. Commissioner, 429 U.S.
1023 (1976); see also B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIRrs 1 111.3.6 (1981) [hereafter FEDERAL TAXATION]. But see Estate of Borax v.
Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) (court adopted a rule of validation to
recognize a Mexican divorce for tax purposes despite a declaration by a New York
court that the prior divorce was invalid), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); Feinberg v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952) (payments made by a husband to his wife
were deductible alimony although a New York court declared the Florida divorce ob-
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in domestic relations matters. 2 Typically, if taxpayers are considered
married under state law, they will be considered married for federal
income tax purposes.
Many states, however, are reducing the role they play in the regula-
tion of marital status." The legal effects of formal marriage have been
reduced by a variety of factors,"' and the trend is toward permitting
couples greater freedom in structuring their marriages. 5 Concurrently,
relationships other than formal marriage are gaining increasing social
tained by the husband a nullity).
2 See Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989, 994 (1980) (concluding that since
Maryland would not recognize divorces obtained in Haiti and the Dominican Republic
the divorces had no effect for tax purposes), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981);
Eccles v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1049, 1051 (interlocutory decree of divorce which did
not constitute a decree for separate maintenance did not end the matrimonial status of
the parties until the lapse of six months, so the taxpayer could file a joint return with
his wife), affd per curiam, 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953).
" Recognition of marriage as a fundamental right has led courts to strike down state
regulations concerning marriage. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (in-
validating a Wisconsin statute requiring residents with support obligations to minors to
provide proof of compliance with the support obligation and to demonstrate that chil-
dren covered by the support order are not likely to become "public charges" to obtain a
marriage license); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's mis-
cegenation laws); see also In re Carrafa, 77 Cal. App. 3d 788, 143 Cal. Rptr. 848 (3d
Dist. 1978) (overruling a Department of Corrections decision denying a prison inmate's
petition to marry).
Professors Weyrauch and Katz have identified increased emphasis on personal rights
and privacy and movement toward a system of government entitlements as factors re-
sulting in decreased judicial and legislative regulation of marriage. W. WEYRAUCH &
S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 350-52 (1983).
" Professor Glendon has identified the following factors as diminishing the legal
effects of formal marriage: (1) constitutional trends recognizing the right to marry and
right to privacy; (2) increased equality and autonomy of spouses; (3) the trend toward
no-fault divorce laws; and (4) recent trends in spousal maintenance after divorce. Glen-
don, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663,
664-67, 684, 697-711 (1976). Professor Clark has concluded that the law appears to be
in the process of redefining marriage and has suggested:
The result seems to be that contemporary marriage cannot be legally de-
fined any more precisely than as some sort of relationship between two
individuals, of indeterminate duration, involving some kind of sexual con-
duct, entailing vague mutual property and support obligations, that may
be formed by consent of both parties and dissolved at the will of either.
Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 441, 450-51 (1975) (footnote
omitted).
" See Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25
UCLA L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1977); Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New
Model For State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of
Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1249-88 (1974).
1983]
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acceptance.' 6 Courts have adopted quasi-marital theories for determin-
ing the rights and obligations of nommarital cohabitants. 7 Thus, the
6 In 1980 there were 1,560,000 households in the United States occupied by two
unrelated adults of the opposite sex. This was nearly three times the number of unmar-
ried couple households in 1970. The partners were frequently in the same age group,
suggesting that many of these households represent quasi-marital relationships. Less
than one percent of the 1980 unmarried couple households had a person 65 years of
age or older sharing living quarters with an unrelated person of the opposite sex who
was under the age of 35. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPU-
LATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 365, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGE-
MENTS: MARCH 1980 4-5. For additional analysis of the increasing number of
nonmarital relationships, see Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers
Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1240 n.1 (1980).
" See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976);
Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72,
499 P.2d 864 (1972); see generally Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Includ-
ing Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976); Casad,
Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract and Back
Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1978); Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnership: A
Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Families, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 453
(1976); Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
937 (1977); Prager, supra note 15, at 19-22; Comment, Property Rights Upon Termi-
nation of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708
(1977); Note, Property Rights Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 50 IND. L. REV. 389
(1975); Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 359 (1978).
In Estate of Thornton, a woman who had lived with the decedent for 16 years,
during which time they had four children, alleged the existence of a partnership inter-
est in the decedent's cattle ranch. The court reversed the grant of a motion to dismiss
the claim, finding that the woman had presented a prima facie case of implied partner-
ship. In the course of its opinion, the court suggested that the plaintiff might have
asserted that her relationship with the decedent "created in her behalf a right similar to
that of a legal wife in the community property of the spousal unit." 81 Wash. 2d at 77,
499 P.2d at 866.
The California Supreme Court made it clear in Marvin that it was not holding that
the parties were "married," or extending the rights of valid or putative spouses to co-
habitants. 18 Cal. 3d at 684 n.24, 557 P.2d at 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
However, the court also stated that:
[A]though parties to a nonmarital relationship obviously cannot have
based any expectations upon the belief that they were married, other ex-
pectations and equitable considerations remain. The parties may well ex-
pect that property will be divided in accord with the parties' own tacit
understanding and that in the absence of such understanding the courts
will fairly apportion property accumulated through mutual effort.
Id. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (emphasis added).
In Carlson v. Olson, the plaintiff brought an action to partition real and personal
property accumulated during the 21 years she and the defendant lived together. The
court affirmed the award of a one-half interest in the property to the plaintiff. Based
[Vol. 17:257
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traditional interest of the states in defining and preserving the legal
structure of marriage appears to be waning, while informal "mar-
riages" are becoming more common. As a result, marriage is becoming
indistinguishable from many less formal relationships.
Recently, the federal income tax has been faced with developments
which are undoubtedly related in some degree to the shift in societal
and judicial views concerning marriage: individuals have attempted to
realize the potential tax benefits derived from shifts in marital status.
Temporary divorces have been undertaken for tax reasons and tempo-
rary marriages have been suggested as a tax planning strategy for the
unmarried. "
The blurring of definitional and functional boundaries between mar-
ital and nonmarital relationships, social acceptance of relationships
outside of formal marriage, and a willingness on the part of some tax-
payers to effect tax motivated changes in marital status mandate a re-
evaluation of the federal tax law's use of state-defined marital status as
an operative tax factor. Marriage-based tax distinctions should be pre-
mised upon assumptions concerning the nature of marriage and its role
in society. For tax distinctions to be rationally based upon marital sta-
tus, marriage should be indicative of an economic relationship and
should be its almost exclusive representative in society. The role of
marital status in the tax law is undercut to the extent marriage prac-
tices vary from accepted norms, nonmarital relationships embody mari-
tal characteristics, or marital status may be manipulated. If these trends
continue, state-defined marital status must play a reduced role in the
income tax. New federal standards, designed to protect and promote tax
policy, must be developed to replace or reinforce state-defined marital
status as a taxing factor. Additionally, courts must be willing to aban-
don local law determinations of marital status and adopt more flexible
analytical approaches when tax policy is threatened.
This Article will examine the role marital status plays in the federal
income tax and the manner in which the tax law determines whether a
taxpayer is single or married. Judicial and administrative reactions to
tax-motivated shifts in marital status will also be analyzed and the in-
upon the evidence concerning the parties' relationship, the court held that the award
was in accord with the reasonable expectations of the parties.
11 See Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (year-end divorces obtained in
Haiti and the Dominican Republic to permit filing as single taxpayers), remanded, 668
F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981); Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40 (situation 2: year-end
foreign divorce obtained to permit separate filing as single individuals); J. SONENBUCK,
THE LEGALITY OF LOVE 158-61 (1981); Randall, Tax Status of Friendly, But Unmar-
ried, Taxpayers, 57 TAxES 27, 32 (1979); Wenig, supra note 2, at § 5.11.
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creasing weakness of state-defined marital status as a taxing factor will
be demonstrated. Finally, this Article will explore potential alternatives
and future developments.
I. MARITAL STATUS AND THE INCOME TAX
A. The Code's Use of Marital Status
There is no unifying thread of policy to explain the many tax dis-
tinctions resting upon marital status. The Code's use of marriage as a
determinative tax factor is neither cohesive nor consistent. On occasion,
spouses are a single taxable unit;19 in certain situations they may be
viewed as separate entities;2" in still other tax provisions a married
couple may be treated as more than one but not quite two single
taxpayers."
For example, the Code, under certain circumstances, permits taxpay-
ers to exclude dividends from gross income.22 However, the maximum
allowable exclusion is $100 for an individual, while spouses filing a
joint return are allowed to exclude $200 of dividends from income.23 In
another provision, the Code generally limits the amount of ordinary
income against which capital losses may be deducted to $3,000 for both
a single person and a married couple. 4 Thus, if A receives $50 of divi-
dends and recognizes $2,500 of short-term capital losses during 1983,
" E.g., I.R.C. § 121(b)(1) (providing that a married couple filing jointly and a sin-
gle taxpayer are entitled to a one-time exclusion of $125,000 of gain from the sale of a
principal residence after attaining age 55); I.R.C. § 163(d)(1)(A) (limiting the amount
of investment interest a married couple filing jointly may deduct to the amount availa-
ble to a single taxpayer); I.R.C. § 165(h)(2) (treating a married couple filing jointly as
one individual for purposes of the $100 and 10% limitations on deductions of casualty
losses).
20 E.g., I.R.C. § 44A(e)(1)(B) (imposing an earned income limitation equal to the
lesser of the earned income of either spouse upon the employment related expenses of a
married couple eligible for child care credit); I.R.C. § 219(0(2) (requiring separate
computation of qualified retirement contributions for each spouse without regard to
community property laws).
1 E.g., I.R.C. § 55(0(1) (granting a married couple filing jointly a $40,000 exemp-
tion amount for purposes of the alternative minimum tax while a single taxpayer ob-
tains a $30,000 exemption amount); I.R.C. § 63(d) (providing a $3,400 zero bracket
,amount for a married couple filing jointly and a $2,300 zero bracket amount for a
single taxpayer); see 1980 JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 3, at 3, 10-15. The only
discernible policy in the Code's treatment of marriage is to discourage separate filing by
married taxpayers. Id. at 9.
22 I.R.C. § 116.
3 I.R.C. § 116(a)(2).
2 I.R.C. § 1211(b).
[Vol. 17:257
1983] Marriage and Tax
and B receives $150 of dividends and recognizes $3,000 of short-term
capital losses during that year, marriage would be a mixed tax blessing
for A and B. If single, A and B could exclude a total of $150 of divi-
dends from income, whereas if they marry they would be allowed to
exclude the full $200 of dividends received during the year. However,
marriage would adversely impact the amount of capital losses A and B
could deduct; if single they could fully deduct their $5,500 of short-
term capital losses, but if they marry, A and B would be limited to a
$3,000 capital loss deduction for the year.2"
The tax law does not consistently favor any particular living ar-
rangement. Rather, each individual's tax circumstances determine
whether marriage will or will not produce tax benefits. At times, there
may be a tax savings for the married individual; at other times a mar-
ried individual might avoid a tax penalty by obtaining a divorce. Nor
is the degree of benefit or detriment attached to marriage uniform; in
certain Code provisions the bonus or penalty attached to marital status
2" The excess $2,500 of short-term capital loss would be treated as a short-term
capital loss in the succeeding taxable year. I.R.C. § 1212(b)(1)(A).
26 The most significant potential tax bonus from marriage is the income splitting
effect of filing a joint return. When one member of a couple earns substantially more
income than the other, they can reduce their total tax liability by marrying. See infra
text accompanying note 88. Additionally, many tax benefit provisions provide married
couples filing joint returns with twice as large a benefit as single taxpayers. This may
permit the couple to deduct or exclude a greater amount than if the parties were single.
For example, § 41 allows a credit equal to one-half of the political contributions made
by the taxpayer during the taxable year. The credit is limited to $50 for an individual
and $100 in the case of married taxpayers filing jointly. I.R.C. § 41(b). Thus, if X
made a $150 political contribution and Y made a $50 political contribution, they would
be allowed credits of $50 and $25, respectively, if they are single. If X and Y married,
they would be allowed a $100 credit. Therefore, marriage would result in a $25 tax
savings. Not surprisingly, unmarried taxpayers living together may be tempted to file
jointly as a married couple to achieve tax savings. E.g., Davis v. Commissioner, 23
T.C.M. 1099 (1964) (unmarried individuals not entitled to file a joint return); see also
In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 863 (1st Dist.
1973) (unmarried couple lived together for over eight years and filed joint income tax
returns).
7 The most significant tax penalty resulting from marriage is the additional tax paid
by two married individuals who earn relatively equal amounts of income. See infra text
accompanying notes 86-87. There is also a tax penalty for marriage in those provisions
which treat a married couple filing jointly as a single taxpayer. For example, § 163(d)
generally limits a taxpayer's deduction for investment interest to $10,000 plus the tax-
payer's "net investment income." The $10,000 limit applies to single taxpayers and
married taxpayers filing jointly. Married taxpayers filing separately are subject to a
$5,000 limit. I.R.C. § 163(d)(1)(A). Thus, taxpayers with substantial amounts of in-
vestment interest could be disadvantaged by marriage.
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is greater proportionately than in others. 8
Inconsistency in the treatment of marital status is largely the result
of legislative indifference to marriage-based tax distinctions. Changes in
Code provisions are frequently accompanied by unexplained changes in
the treatment of married taxpayers. For example, prior to 1981 the
$100 exclusion for dividends was applied to each individual taxpayer,
regardless of marital status.2 9 Therefore, in 1980, A and B in the ear-
lier example would have been entitled to exclude $150 of dividends
whether married or single if they did not jointly own stock. Also, for
years prior to 1981, taxpayers were allowed additional first-year depre-
ciation on qualifying property." This benefit was limited to a total of
$10,000 of qualifying property for a single taxpayer, while married
couples filing jointly were entitled to additional first-year depreciation
21 Compare I.R.C. § 63(d) (two single individuals are entitled to $1,200, or about
35%, more zero bracket amount than a married couple) with I.R.C. § 217(b)(3) (im-
posing identical dollar limits upon deductions of certain moving expenses by married
couples filing jointly and single taxpayers) and I.R.C. § 37(b)(2), (c)(1) (two single
individuals are entitled to $1,250, or 33%, more credit base under the credit for the
elderly than a married couple filing jointly if both spouses are eligible for the credit; for
purposes of the adjusted gross income limitation, two single taxpayers are permitted
S5,000, or 50%, more base than a married couple filing jointly).
29 Prior to 1981, § 116(a) provided:
EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME. - Gross income does not include
amounts received by an individual as dividends from domestic corpora-
tions, to the extent that the dividends do not exceed $100. If the dividends
received in a taxable year exceed $100, the exclusion provided by the pre-
ceding sentence shall apply to the dividends first received in such year.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, § 116(a), 68A Stat. 3, 37, amended
by Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 201(c), 78 Stat. 19, 32 (1964), and by Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
1901(a)(20), 90 Stat. 1525, 1766 (1976) "current version at I.R.C. § 116(a)".
The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 amended § 116, effective for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1980, and before January 1, 1983, to make that
section applicable to interest and to increase the amount of the exclusion to $200 for an
individual and $400 in the case of a married couple filing jointly. Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 404(a), (c), 94 Stat. 305-08 (1980).
There was no explanation for the change in treatment of married taxpayers. H.R. REP.
No. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 156-58 (1980).
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 repealed the $200/$400 interest and divi-
dend exclusion for taxable years beginning after 1981 and replaced it with the present
version of § 116 which provides a $100 (8200 in the case of joint returns) exclusion for
dividends received from a domestic corporation. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 302(b)(2), 95 Stat. 272 (1981).
,o Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 204(b), 72 Stat. 1679 (1958) (current version at I.R.C. §
179).
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on $20,000 of property." As part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Congress repealed the allowance for additional first-year depreci-
ation and replaced it with a provision permitting taxpayers to elect to
expense the cost of qualifying property." The aggregate amount of
property subject to the expense election in 1983 is $5,000 for a single
taxpayer and married taxpayers filing jointly, while married taxpayers
filing separate returns are each allowed to expense a total of $2,500 of
property." In changing the statute, Congress without explanation sub-
stantially reduced the benefits available for a married couple as com-
pared to two single individuals."'
B. Marital Status and Tax Rates
The absence of consistent themes within the Code does not compel
the conclusion that all tax distinctions based upon marital status are
unprincipled or lack policy justification. Extensive consideration has
been devoted to the taxation of the family. There is ongoing debate
among commentators concerning the relationship between family cir-
cumstances and the federal income tax, and significant legislative
changes have been enacted to implement conscious policy decisions."
The relationship between marital status and tax rates has been par-
ticularly controversial. Tax theorists have thoroughly debated the ex-
tent to which marital relationships should affect an individual's tax lia-
bility. One group of theorists has advocated, based upon considerations
of equity and efficiency, a marriage neutral tax system in which each
individual's tax liability is determined separately under a single rate
schedule. 6 Marital status, it is argued, is a personal decision which
31 Id.
32 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 202(a), 95 Stat. 172,
219-20 (1981).
3 I.R.C. § 179(b).
" No explanation was given for the change in treatment of married taxpayers. See S.
REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-61 (1981); S. REP. No. 176, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 209 (1981).
3, See infra text accompanying notes 42-51. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 4; Gann,
Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx.
L. REV. 1 (1980); Jensen, The Historical Discrimination of the Federal Income Tax
Rates, 54 TAxEs 445 (1976); McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Com-
prehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977).
" E.g., Brazer, Income Tax Treatment of the Family, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAX-
ATION 223 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin ed. 1980) (urging that the individual be the unit
for income taxation and outlining alternatives for the taxation of income from property
held by married taxpayers); Gann, supra note 35 (suggesting mandatory separate filing
under a single rate schedule as the most preferable alternative and arguing for disre-
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should not bear upon tax liability. The competing view is that marriage
represents an economic relationship which should be considered in allo-
cating tax burdens among taxpayers." It is urged that married taxpay-
ers with equal aggregate incomes should bear identical tax burdens.
However, some commentators advocating the married couple as a taxa-
ble unit also apply various criteria to determine the relative tax burdens
of one-earner married couples, two-earner married couples, and single
taxpayers. 8
Tax policy discussions concerning the relationship between marriage
and tax liability are inconclusive. Writers have disagreed as to the ex-
tent of actual economic sharing in marriage and the role state law
property rights should play in determining tax liability. 9 Also, disa-
gard of the effect of community property laws); Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The
Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 27 (1978) (advocating permitting
married couples to file separately and use the rate schedules available to single taxpay-
ers); Mess, For Richer, For Poorer: Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 CATH. U.L.
REV. 87 (1978) (proposing separate filing with a federal definition of income which
would eliminate differences attributable to state law); Munnell, The Couple versus the
Individual under the Federal Personal Income Tax, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXA-
TION 247 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin ed. 1980) (arguing for the individual as the basic
unit for the taxation of earned income and suggesting that unearned income be equally
split between spouses); Rosen, Is it Time to Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J.
423 (1977) (arguing for separate filing and disregard of community property laws);
Note, The Case for Mandatory Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91 YALE L.J. 363
(1981) (advocating mandatory separate filing with adoption of arbitrary rules to allo-
cate exemptions and deductions which present administrative difficulties).
" McIntyre, supra note 4 (arguing that critics of joint filing have not adequately
addressed the economic relationship represented by marriage); Oldman & Temple,
Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 603
(1960) (concluding that taxation of the married couple "is more reasonable, in terms of
economic realities and administrative facility, than separate taxation of spouses"); see
McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 35 (advocating adoption of a benefit rule for income
attribution and suggesting separate filing and allocation of one-half of the couple's total
income to each spouse).
" Oldman & Temple, supra note 37, at 603-04. Other writers have questioned the
theoretical basis for these distinctions, arguing that it may not be possible to accurately
ascertain the economic advantages of different living arrangements, or to establish ap-
propriate fairness criteria to distinguish different taxpayers. Bittker, supra note 4, at
1422-25; McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 35, at 1574 n.2. However, as part of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Congress enacted § 221 which permits a deduc-
tion for two-earner married couples. One of the justifications for this legislation was to
decrease the disparity of treatment between one-earner and two-earner couples. S. REP.
No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1981).
", Compare Gann, supra note 35, at 26 (suggesting mandatory separate filing, disre-
garding the effect of community property laws, and stating "hard data does not gener-
ally substantiate the assumption that married persons equally share their income") with
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greement exists concerning the relative tax burdens of different taxpay-
ing units.4 Professor Gann has summarized the current state of debate
concerning these issues: "No one has yet suggested a system for alloca-
tion of tax burdens between married and single persons that is based on
fairness criteria, accounts for the status of marriage, and receives the
approval of all.""
A great deal of legislative attention has also been directed toward the
relationship between marital status and tax rates. Prior to 1948, all
taxpayers were required to use a single progressive rate schedule. 2
This favored married couples living in community property states rela-
tive to those in common law states. Since under community property
laws one-half of each spouse's income is attributed to the other spouse,
couples in community property states were allowed to split their total
income for tax purposes."3 Income splitting reduces tax liability in a
progressive rate structure because each half of the couple's income is
subject to the lowest rates rather than being aggregated, with one-half
taxed at higher marginal rates. A couple living in a community prop-
erty state with $30,000 of income would pay less tax than a couple
living in a common law state with the same income unless each spouse's
income was exactly $15,000. As part of the Revenue Act of 1948, Con-
gress largely eliminated geographical distinctions by extending the ben-
efits of income splitting to all married couples. A second rate schedule
was created which permitted married taxpayers filing jointly to pay
twice as much tax as a single taxpayer with one-half the income.""
McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 35, at 1596 (advocating adoption of a benefit rule and
allocation of one-half of the couple's total income to each spouse; recognizing that accu-
rate data are not available, the authors state, "a fifty-fifty division is based on the
realistic assumption that married couples do pool their income, each obtaining more or
less equal benefit").
0 Compare Oldman & Temple, supra note 37, at 603-04 (urging that (1) a married
couple with one spouse having income should pay more tax than a married couple with
both spouses working, assuming both couples have equal income; (2) a dual income
couple should pay more tax than two single individuals with the same incomes; and (3)
a single person should pay the same or more tax than a married couple with the same
total income) with McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 35, at 1574 n.2, 1595 n.80 (con-
cluding that the criteria used by Oldman and Temple are inadequate).
" Gann, supra note 35, at 29.
2 Bittker, supra note 4, at 1400; Gann, supra note 35, at 10.
," Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110 (1930) (state community property laws are
given effect for federal tax purposes); see Bittker, supra note 4, at 1404-08; Gann,
supra note 35, at 13-20.
" Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301-303, 62 Stat. 114 (1948) (codified as vari-
ous sections of the I.R.C.).
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Thus, married couples with equal total incomes paid equal taxes re-
gardless of state property laws.
The extension of income splitting to all married persons had a rela-
tive adverse impact upon single taxpayers. In 1951 Congress enacted a
head of household rate schedule,45 and in 1954 income splitting was
extended to surviving spouses." These acts granted a degree of income
splitting to single taxpayers with family obligations similar to marriage.
Later, in 1969, Congress examined the tax differential between single
and married taxpayers and concluded that the disparity of treatment
was excessive. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress en-
acted a new rate schedule for all single persons which limited the tax
paid to no more than 120 percent of the tax paid by married taxpayers
with the same taxable income."' Married taxpayers filing separately
were required to use the former rate schedules for single persons to
prevent them from paying less tax than if they filed jointly. As a conse-
quence of the 1969 changes, married taxpayers with relatively equal
incomes were required to pay more tax filing jointly than two single
taxpayers with the same incomes."'
Recently, this "marriage penalty" has been the subject of legislative
attention. As part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Congress
alleviated the penalty by creating a new deduction equal to a percent-
age of the earnings of the spouse with the lower earnings."9 The change
was justified by several policy grounds. First, large tax penalties on
marriage are thought to undermine respect for both marriage and the
" Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 301, 65 Stat. 480 (1951) (current version at
I.R.C. § l(b)). See generally Bittker, supra note 4, at 1416-19.
" Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2, 68A Stat. 8 (1954) (current version
at I.R.C. §§ l(a), 2(a)). See generally Bittker, supra note 4, at 1416-19.
, Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 678 (1969) (current
version at I.R.C. § 1(c), (d)); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 260 (1969). See
generally Bittker, supra note 4, at 1428-29.
4 Bittker, supra note 4, at 1429-31. See generally Richards, Discrimination Against
Married Couples Under Present Income Tax Laws, 49 TAxEs 526 (1971); Richards,
Single v. Married Income Tax Returns Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 48 TAxEs
301 (1970); Note, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Married and Single
Taxpayers, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 667 (1974).
" The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172
(1981) (codified as I.R.C. § 221). For a criticism of the congressional solution, see
Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's 1981 Response to the "Marriage
Penalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 468 (1983). Congressional hearings were held in
1980 regarding the comparative tax treatment of married couples, single persons, and
heads of household. Tax Treatment of Married, Head of Household, and Single Tax-




tax system. Second, lower marginal rates applicable to the second
earner's income should promote that spouse's entry into the labor mar-
ket. Finally, the new deduction will decrease the disparity of treatment
between one-earner and two-earner married couples. Congress accepted
the argument that two-earner married couples should pay less tax than
one-earner couples with the same income since the former incur more
work related expenses and do not enjoy the tax-free benefits of the ef-
forts of a nonworking spouse. 0 However, new section 221 does not
eliminate the marriage penalty, it merely reduces it. Since the provision
violates the principle that couples with equal aggregate incomes pay
identical taxes, it reintroduced the issue of the tax effect of state prop-
erty laws. Congress resolved the property law issue by providing that
community property laws are to be disregarded for purposes of comput-
ing the base for the deduction."
This brief history indicates that rather than being haphazard, much
of the current disorder in the tax law concerning the relationship be-
tween marriage and tax liability is the consequence of the long-term
development of a comprehensive statute. Many of the changes were
politically motivated and the result of legislative compromise. However,
they represent conscious, albeit at times conflicting, attempts to adjust
the Code's treatment of marital relations.
The trends concerning marriage and the tax developments discussed
in this Article require that additional legislative attention be given to
marriage-based distinctions. They may result in significant shifts in the
tax law's treatment of marital status and tax rates. Shifts in taxpayer
views regarding marriage and an increased awareness of tax distinc-
tions resting upon marital status will fuel debate concerning marriage's
role in determining an individual's tax liability. 2
II. DETERMINING MARITAL STATUS FOR TAX PURPOSES
The Internal Revenue Code determines the tax consequences of
events which have independent state law effect." The interaction be-
tween local law and the federal income tax has been described by the
Supreme Court:
State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts
designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed. Our duty is to
ascertain the meaning of words used to specify the thing taxed. If it is
10 S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1981).
" I.R.C. § 221(b)(1).
" See infra text accompanying notes 130-46.
s1 FEDERAL TAXATION, supra note 11, at 1 4.1.1.
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found in a given case that an interest or right created by local law was the
object intended to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what
name is given to the interest or right by state law."
Marital status for tax purposes is generally determined at year-end."5
While the meaning of a term in the Code is a federal question, courts
have consistently looked to state-defined marital status to determine
whether an individual is married for tax purposes.5 6 Deference has
been accorded to local law because marriage, its existence and dissolu-
tion, is uniquely within the province of the states.5 7 If taxpayers are
married under local law at the close of their taxable year, they are
generally viewed as married by the Internal Revenue Code.5" Accept-
" Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940) (state law characterization
of a power of appointment is not relevant for federal estate tax purposes).
" I.R.C. §§ 143, 6013.
56 See, e.g., Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (concluding that Maryland
would not recognize Haitian and Dominican Republic divorces; thus the divorces had
no effect for tax purposes), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981); Eccles v. Com-
missioner, 19 T.C. 1049 (interlocutory decree of divorce which did not constitute a
decree for separate maintenance did not end the matrimonial status of the parties until
lapse of six months so that the taxpayer could file a joint return with his wife), affd
per curiam, 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953). But see Estate of Borax v. Commissioner,
349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) (adopting a rule of validation to recognize a Mexican
divorce for tax purposes despite a declaration by a New York court that the divorce was
invalid), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260
(3d Cir. 1952) (payments made by a husband to his wife were deductible as alimony
although a New York court declared the Florida divorce obtained by the husband a
nullity). The Supreme Court has held that state law may control when the Code, "by
express language or necessary implication, makes its own operation dependent upon
state law." Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932); see also FEDERAL TAXATION,
supra note 11, at 1 4.1.1. Courts have relied upon the absence of general federal law
definitions of marriage to conclude that Congress intended state-defined marital status
to be used for federal tax purposes. Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552, 558 (1975),
affd per curiam, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977).
" Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989, 994 (1980), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th
Cir. 1981); Gersten v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 756, 770 (1957), affd in part, re-
manded in part, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); Eccles v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1049,
1051, affd per curiam, 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953). Some courts have mistakenly
suggested that state-defined marital status is controlling due to full faith and credit
obligations or principles of collateral estoppel. Comment, State Domestic Relations Law
and Federal Tax Policy, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 150, 152 (1966); see Note, Divorce, Con-
flict of Laws, and the IRS - The "Rule of Validation" As a Solution to Matrimonial
Tax Difficulties: Estate of Spalding v. Commissioner, 9 CONN. L. REV. 282, 287-90
(1977) [hereafter, Note, Divorce, Conflict of Laws, and the I.R.S.].
58 However, a taxpayer is considered married even if not married at the end of the
taxable year if the taxpayer's spouse died during the year. I.R.C. §§ 143(a)(1),
6013(a)(2).
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ance of state concepts of marriage also extends to common law mar-
riages which, if valid in the state in which they are undertaken, are
recognized for tax purposes. 9 Additionally, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice generally will not challenge the validity of any divorce decree until
the decree is declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Congress, however, has mandated federal definitions of marital status
in a limited number of tax provisions. If applicable, these definitions
supersede local law determinations of marital status. For example, indi-
viduals who are legally separated from their spouses under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance are often considered single for pur-
poses of determining their federal income tax liability."' Also, if a hus-
band and wife live apart during the entire taxable year, one or both is
considered single if that individual provides over one-half of the cost of
a home in which the individual resides with a dependent child.'
The process of determining marital status for tax purposes is illus-
trated by Capodanno v. Commissioner.3 Lilley and R.T. Capodanno
were married and lived together until 1964. In 1965, Lilley instituted
an action against R.T. under New Jersey's separate maintenance stat-
ute, and in 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court awarded her $400
per month retroactive to the day the action was filed. In her 1971 fed-
-eral income tax return, Lilley claimed to be single, relying upon section
143(a)(2), which considers married taxpayers legally separated under a
decree of divorce or separate maintenance single for return filing
purposes.
The Tax Court began by noting that section 143 requires the decree
to effectuate a legal separation - it must expressly and affirmatively
, Von Tersch v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 415 (1967); Peveler v. Commissioner, 39
T.C.M. 502 (1979); Ross v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 488 (1972); Amaro v. Commis-
sioner, 29 T.C.M. 914 (1970); Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60.
' Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65 (the validity of a divorce will not be questioned
for tax purposes until a court of competent jurisdiction declares the divorce invalid);
Rev. Rul. 71-390, 1971-2 C.B. 82 (a Mexican divorce was not questioned since a court
of competent jurisdiction had not declared the divorce invalid). But see Gersten v. Com-
missioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959).
11 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 44A(f)(3), 121(d)(6)(B), 143(a)(2), 6013(d)(2). One commentator
has urged expansion of this standard to permit more married taxpayers living apart to
file as single individuals. Hesch, Separated Couples and the Marriage Penalty, 45
ALB. L. REV. 116 (1980). Professor Hesch recognized the possibility of abuse of more
liberal standards and suggested recognition of court support orders only, or a require-
ment that taxpayers live apart in order to file as single taxpayers. Id. at 136.
"2 I.R.C. § 143(b).
" 69 T.C. 638 (1978), affd, 602 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1979).
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provide that the parties live apart."' The court examined New Jersey
law to ascertain the effect of the decree of separate maintenance and
concluded that it did not constitute a legal separation. The original
marital relationship was unaltered for determining return filing
status.6"
Capodanno illustrates the manner in which local law and federal tax
law interact to arrive at a tax marital status. Initially, the court looked
to the state law effect of the decree to analyze whether section 143 re-
quired the taxpayers to be treated as single despite their existing mari-
tal status. Satisfied that those federal standards were not met, the court
then, without discussion, adopted the taxpayers' state-defined marital
status for federal tax purposes.
The tax law's reliance upon state-defined marital status as an opera-
tive tax factor occasionally produces anomalous tax results. To illus-
trate, section 1239 of the Code provides that gain recognized upon the
sale or exchange of property between spouses is to be treated as ordi-
nary income if the property is depreciable in the hands of the trans-
feree."' The section is designed to prevent tax benefits which would
otherwise result upon a sale of appreciated depreciable property be-
tween related persons. Absent that provision, a purchaser could obtain
a fair market value basis in depreciable property for the relatively small
cost of a capital gains tax to the related seller. The increased basis
would generate larger future depreciation deductions which offset ordi-
nary income; the difference between these future tax savings and the
current capital gains tax to the seller could make the transaction finan-
cially beneficial to the parties, since their combined tax burden would
be reduced. Congress, in section 1239, recognized the community of ec-
onomic interest that generally exists between spouses and denied this
benefit by characterizing the seller's gain as ordinary income and rais-
ing the tax cost of the basis increase. 7
In Deyoe v. Commissioner,6 Elizabeth Deyoe sold her community
property interest in appreciated depreciable property to her husband as
part of a divorce settlement. Determining that the sale took place prior
to the entry of the divorce decree, the Internal Revenue Service asserted
that section 1239 required Elizabeth's gain to be characterized as ordi-
64 69 T.C. at 647.
65 Id. at 648.
66 I.R.C. § 1239(a), (b)(1).
67 JOINT COMM. STAFF, 82D CONG., 1ST SESS., SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF THE
REVENUE AcT OF 1951, reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 287, 314.
" 66 T.C. 904 (1976).
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nary income. The Tax Court upheld the Service's position, relying
upon the fact that the taxpayers were married under state law at the
time of the sale."' The court was not persuaded that section 1239
should be limited to situations involving an ongoing marriage, when it
can be assumed that the seller retains some control of the asset. The
court, while agreeing that section 1239's policy did not extend to the
divorce situation, felt constrained by the absence of an explicit statutory
exception for dissolution proceedings. 0 The irony is that if the Deyoes
had planned the sale to occur following the divorce, there is little doubt
that the sting of section 1239 would have been avoided."
Similarly, the tax law's limited attempts to define marital status cre-
ate distinctions which are difficult to reconcile on theoretical grounds.
Why should spouses legally separated by a decree be treated as single
taxpayers while a "married" couple under an interlocutory decree of
divorce is considered married?7 Is there any significant difference
which should alter their tax situations? Why should the tax law recog-
nize a marital relationship that has broken down with the parties exe-
cuting a written separation agreement and fail to recognize the rela-
tionship between an unmarried couple which lives together and has
raised children?" Which relationship more closely resembles traditional
concepts of marriage?
A great deal, but not all, of this confusion is attributable to the need
for certainty in the tax laws."' Fixed and immutable boundaries within
69 Id. at 913.
70 Support for the decision was also found in the Internal Revenue Service's histori-
cal inability to establish that couples under interlocutory decrees of divorce are not
husband and wife for the purposes of certain tax provisions. Id. at 914-15.
" duPont v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. 115, 124-25 (1978) (transfers of assets pur-
suant to a property settlement which became effective after divorce were not subject to
§ 267 or § 1239).
" Compare I.R.C. § 143(a)(2) (an individual legally separated under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance is not married) with Commissioner v. Ostler, 237 F.2d
501 (9th Cir. 1956) (husband and wife permitted to file joint return prior to interlocu-
tory decree of divorce becoming final); Eccles v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1049 (joint
return permitted before interlocutory decree became effective), affd per curiam, 208
F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953); and Rev. Rul. 57-368, 1957-2 C.B. 896 (acquiescence sub-
stituted for nonacquiescence in Eccles).
" Compare Donigan v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 632 (1977) (a taxpayer separated
under a written separation agreement is not entitled to file as a single individual) with
Peacock v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. 177 (1978) (taxpayer and a woman with whom
he had lived and had had two children were not "spouses" for purposes of the depen-
dency and medical expenses deductions).
" Congress has, however, demonstrated the ability to make more subtle distinctions
concerning the nature of family relationships. Sections 66 and 879 of the Code provide
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any body of law produce questionable results near the border; they also
generate significant benefits. Established and certain principles in the
income tax assist both taxpayers and the government. Individuals are
able to plan their affairs with relative certainty as to the tax conse-
quences and the government's administrative burden is lightened by
laws which generate distinct answers. The inclination to achieve tax
results which reflect reality must be tempered by concern for the future
utility of the statute. The benefits of certainty must be balanced against
the vice of occasional inequity."
These concerns should not mandate stagnation. Rather, they indicate
that one should approach the problem with caution, recognizing that
any improvements in the income tax's use of marital status as a taxing
factor or the processes for determining that status will likely be flawed.
They may also be temporary. Professor Bittker, while examining the
pressures upon the Internal Revenue Code resulting from changing so-
cietal views concerning the family, has observed that any current tax
reforms generated by today's social trends will be "as particularistic
and transitory as the laws they supplant.
'76
III. TAX-MOTIVATED DIVORCES
Historically, taxpayers have not manipulated marital status as a tax
planning device. The tax consequences of marriage and divorce have
been closely examined and planning often plays a significant role in
those events, 7 but, despite potential savings, large numbers of taxpay-
ers have not attempted temporary marriages or divorces to reduce tax
liability. There are undoubtedly numerous reasons for this behavior.
The failure of individuals to manipulate marital status for tax benefits
is quite likely a manifestation of their attitude toward the personal and
legal relationships embodied in marriage. An individual might under-
standably value those considerations over a potential financial gain and
that the effect of state community property laws will be disregarded if a married couple
lives apart during the year, does not file jointly, and no part of any earned income
which is community income is transferred between the spouses.
" See Bittker, supra note 4, at 1398-99.
16 Id. at 1392.
" E.g., Goetting, Tax Aspects of Marital Separation, 40 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX.
28-1 (1982); Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a
Proposal, 50 WASH. L. REV. 231 (1975); Kramer, Estate Planning for the Stable and
Not-So-Stable Marriage and Nonmarital Cohabitation, 39 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX.
56-1 (1981); Taylor & Schwartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 TAX




opt against disturbing the relationships even on a transitory basis." Ig-
norance of the tax law may also be a factor. Restrictive state laws may
make these strategies difficult. It could also be that taxpayers have con-
sciously balanced potential tax savings against the expense and effort
required to alter marital status and decided the financial benefits are
outweighed by these factors.
Some taxpayers, however, appear to be changing their views. Mar-
ried and unmarried individuals seem to be increasingly willing to vary
their marital status to obtain tax benefits. Year-end divorces have been
used in attempts to save taxes, and commentators have suggested year-
end marriages as a potential tax savings device for unmarried cohabi-
tants. 9 The reasons behind these developments are as complex as those
underlying the earlier reluctance of individuals to pursue these strate-
gies. Possibly, the tax stakes involved have risen to a level which has
increased awareness of potential savings and makes marital status
changes economically viable.80 Changing social mores are unquestion-
ably a factor. Also, recent trends blurring the legal distinctions between
marital and less formal relationships may have reduced the importance
of marital status,8 making movement in and out of marriage less signif-
icant and a more acceptable means for reducing taxes.
A. Potential Tax Savings from Tax-Motivated Divorces
Whatever the reason behind these trends, there are potentially signif-
icant tax savings available if tax-motivated divorces," typically under-
7" Professor Bittker has suggested that some of these considerations underlie the re-
luctance of family members to engage in tax motivated transactions. Bittker, supra note
4, at 1394.
" Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (year-end divorces obtained in Haiti
and Dominican Republic to permit filing as single taxpayers), remanded, 668 F.2d
1382 (4th Cir. 1981); Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40 (situation 2: year-end foreign
divorce obtained to permit separate filing as single individuals); Private Ruling
7835076 (June 1, 1978) (divorce obtained to permit filing as single individuals and the
taxpayers intend to continue to live together); J. SONENBLICK, supra note 18, at 158-
61; Randall, supra note 18, at 32; Wenig, supra note 2, at § 5.11.
so In Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th
Cir. 1981), the taxpayers obtained divorces at the end of 1975 and 1976 in order to file
as single individuals. The deficiencies related to this issue totalled $1,198.34 for 1975
and $1,937 for 1976. Also, the Boyters estimated that the marriage penalty would cost
them at least $130,000 over their lifetimes. Tax Treatment of Married, Head of House-
hold, and Single Taxpayers: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1980) (statements of David and Angela Boyter).
SI See infra notes 13-15, 17 and accompanying text.
52 One author has coined the term "boomerang divorce" to describe a divorce ob-
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taken with a view toward remarriage or to return the individuals to an
unmarried status, are recognized for tax purposes. Two sets of tax pro-
visions, the rate schedules and the alimony provisions, are particularly
susceptible to abuse by this strategy.
Currently, individuals are taxed at different rates depending upon
their marital status. Married couples are permitted to file jointly or
separately, and the tax rates for married taxpayers filing jointly are
exactly the same as the rates for married taxpayers filing separately,
but the brackets for joint returns are twice as wide. This situation per-
mits married couples filing jointly to pay the same tax they would pay
if their aggregate taxable income was divided between them and they
filed separately. 3 This income splitting benefit makes it seldom advan-
tageous for married taxpayers to file separately. 4 Single taxpayers,
other than surviving spouses and heads of households, are taxed at rates
which result in tax liability up to 20% higher than that for married
couples with the same income, but less than the taxes paid by a mar-
ried taxpayer filing separately with the same income.8
Because married taxpayers filing separately use rates which exceed
the rates applied to single individuals, a "marriage penalty" may result
if single individuals having relatively equal taxable incomes marry. In
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Congress acted to mitigate
the marriage penalty by allowing married taxpayers filing jointly a de-
duction equal to ten percent (five percent in 1982) of the lesser of
$30,000 or the earned income of the spouse with the lower earned in-
come. 6 The new provision still fails to eliminate the potential tax in-
centive in divorce. For example, if C and D are married and earn sala-
tained to manipulate tax marital status. J. SONENBLICK, supra note 18, at 158.
"3 I.R.C. § l(a), (d); 1980 JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 3, at 8; FEDERAL TAX-
ATION, supra note 11, at 111.3.
", Married taxpayers may reduce their total tax liability by filing separately if one
spouse has a large amount of deductions which are allowed only to the extent they
exceed a percentage of adjusted gross income. For example, if one spouse has a large
casualty loss or medical expense during the year and the couple has relatively equal
incomes, the couple may benefit by filing separately since the deduction limitation
would only be a percentage of the spouse's, rather than the couple's, adjusted gross
income. Married couples may also file separately for reasons of privacy, when the rela-
tionship has broken down, or to avoid joint liability with respect to the return. 1980
JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 3, at 9; FEDERAL TAXATION, supra note 11, at
111.3.2. It is estimated that only 1.3% of all married couples file separately. 1980
JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 3, at 48.
" I.R.C. § l(a), (c), (d); 1980 JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 3, at 9.
6 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172
(1981) (codified as I.R.C. § 221).
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ries of $30,000 and $25,000 they would be entitled to a $2,500
deduction under section 221 and, if they file jointly, would have a total
tax liability of $12,214 in 1983. If C and D were single, their total tax
would be $10,626; marriage would increase their tax liability by
$1,588.87 Since marital status for filing purposes is generally deter-
mined on the last day of the taxable year, it is not surprising that mar-
ried couples with relatively equal incomes would consider temporary
year-end divorces to obtain these tax savings.
The rate schedules do not consistently favor divorce. Single couples
might also consider year-end changes of marital status to reduce their
total tax burden. If E and F are single and have $35,000 of taxable
income, all of which was earned by E, their 1983 tax would be $7,917.
If they married, the income splitting benefit in the joint return privilege
and the additional personal exemption would reduce their total tax to
$5,964; thus, a temporary year-end marriage would save E and F
$1,953 in taxes.8
Sections 71 and 215 of the Code provide that if a couple is divorced
or legally separated under a decree of divorce or of separate mainte-
nance, periodic payments discharging the payor's marital support obli-
gations constitute income to the recipient and are deductible by the
payor8 The effect of these provisions is to allow divorced taxpayers to
shift the incidence of taxation from the payor to the recipient with re-
spect to the payments."0 A temporary shift in marital status could thus
'7 The calculations in the text assume the taxpayers have no other 1 62 ]deductions,
are each allowed one $1,000 exemption, do not have excess itemized deductions, and do
not have to make an unused zero bracket amount computation under § 63(e). In the
example, C and D's marginal tax rate if filing jointly is 40%. As unmarried taxpayers,
C's marginal tax rate is 30% and D's is 32%.
S As a single individual, E's marginal tax rate is 36%. If E and F file jointly their
marginal tax rate is 30%.
89 I.R.C. §§ 71(a)(1), 215(a). Sections 71 and 215 provide the same treatment for
payments made pursuant to a written separation agreement or a decree for support
which discharges the payor's support obligations. I.R.C. §§ 71(a)(2), (3), 215(a).
" The progenitors of §§ 71 and 215 were originally partially justified as a relief
measure from the high World War II tax rates. Under these provisions, the payor was
no longer taxed upon alimony payments made to the former spouse. See H.R. REP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 427; S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 568.
The income splitting or assignment of income potential in these provisions was more
fully recognized when, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the § 215 deduction was
made allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-555, § 502(a), 90 Stat. 1559 (1976); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
94TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976
116 (Comm. Print 1976).
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be used as an income splitting strategy. If married, C and D in the
previous example could reduce their 1983 federal tax liability by an
additional $8 if they required C, in a year-end divorce settlement, to
make $2,500 in periodic payments to D. The payments would be taxa-
ble to D and deductible by C, equalizing their respective taxable in-
comes and further reducing their taxes. This strategy would provide
large financial rewards to married couples with greatly disparate in-
comes. They could obtain a year-end divorce, use the alimony provi-
sions of the Code to equalize their incomes, and take advantage of the
more favorable tax rates for single taxpayers. Even unmarried taxpay-
ers could obtain tax benefits through the divorce provisions. A tempo-
rary marriage and subsequent divorce have been suggested as an in-
come splitting strategy."
Many of these strategies entail legal and practical difficulties. Com-
mentators have recognized the ethical issues involved in using state
courts to achieve temporary divorces;92 perhaps that explains why tax-
motivated divorces generally have been attempted in foreign jurisdic-
tions.93 Additionally, some of these options, such as strategies using ali-
mony payments, require permanent financial commitments which an
individual might be reluctant to undertake despite potential tax savings.
B. Revenue Ruling 76-255, Private Ruling 7835076, and Boyter
v. Commissioner
Revenue Ruling 76-25594 was the Internal Revenue Service's first
pronouncement dealing with tax-motivated divorces. In the ruling, C
and D, a married couple, obtained a valid foreign divorce on December
30, 1975, and remarried in January 1976. The divorce was obtained to
enable C and D to file returns as single individuals, and they intended,
at the time of divorce, to remarry early in the succeeding year. The
ruling states that neither section 143 nor section 6013 contemplates a
sham transaction designed to manipulate marital status for income tax
purposes. Abandoning state-defined marital status, the ruling relies
" J. SONENBLICK, supra note 18, at 160; Wenig, supra note 2, at § 5.11.
J j SONENBLICK, supra note 18, at 158-59 (one of the parties must commit perjury
to establish that the marriage is irretrievably broken or to prove fault if grounds for
divorce are not present).
" See Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (year-end divorces obtained in
Haiti and the Dominican Republic), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981); Rev.
Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40 (situation 2: year-end divorce obtained under the law of a
"foreign jurisdiction").
" 1976-2 C.B. 40 (situation 2).
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upon Gregory v. Helvering" to conclude that the divorce had no effect
for tax purposes since the parties intended to and did remarry. Accord-
ingly, C and D were required to file as married individuals, either
jointly or separately, for 1975.
What if the taxpayers in Revenue Ruling 76-255 had not remarried
but continued to cohabit? Would they achieve the desired tax result?
Undoubtedly, the Service would view them as single individuals follow-
ing their divorce. In Private Ruling 7835076,'96 the Service considered
the marital status of a couple who planned a year-end divorce for tax
reasons and did not intend to remarry. The Service concluded the tax-
payers would be considered unmarried if they were legally divorced by
year-end and seemed to distinguish Revenue Ruling 76-255 based upon
the absence of an intention to remarry.9
" 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Mrs. Gregory owned all of the stock of a corporation which
owned 1000 shares of the Monitor Securities Corporation. To obtain the Monitor
shares, Mrs. Gregory formed the Averill Corporation, had the Monitor shares trans-
ferred to that corporation in what was ostensibly a tax free reorganization, and then
liquidated the Averill Corporation reporting a capital gain on the liquidation. Absent
the tax free reorganization, the receipt of Monitor shares would have been a dividend,
and Mrs. Gregory would have paid more tax. Although the steps taken satisfied the
statutory requirements for a reorganization, the Court concluded that Congress did not
intend for tax free treatment to be extended to transactions "having no business or
corporate purpose." Id. at 469. In affirming a decision in favor of the Internal Revenue
Service, the Court established the basis for the sham transaction doctrine:
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits, cannot be doubted. But the question for determination is whether
what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute
intended ....
In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are suscepti-
ble of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted
according to the terms of subdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and
devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization,
and nothing else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive
of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction
upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise
would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provi-
sion in question of all serious purpose.
Id. at 469-70 (citations omitted).
96 June 1, 1978.
" The private ruling's finding that the taxpayers were single was cryptically condi-
tioned by the requirement that there be "no factors present that indicate otherwise."
Private Ruling 7835076 (June 1, 1978). Case law supports the ruling's conclusion. In
Peveler v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. 502 (1979), the Tax Court held that taxpayers
who had divorced but continued to live together did not satisfy state law standards for
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Boyter v. Commissioner,98 the first case to consider the tax effect of
tax-motivated divorces, involved a taxpayer attempt to avoid the mar-
riage penalty by utilizing year-end divorces.99 In late 1975, Angela and
David Boyter traveled to the Republic of Haiti where they obtained a
decree of divorce on grounds of incompatibility of character. After re-
turning to Maryland, Angela and David remarried on January 9,
1976. In November of 1976, the Boyters traveled to the Dominican
Republic where they again divorced, this time alleging incompatibility
of temperament as the basis for the action. On February 10, 1977, the
Boyters again remarried. Both the Haitian and Dominican divorce de-
crees recited the fact that the Boyters resided and were domiciled in
Maryland.
The Boyters contended that since they were not married as of the
close of their 1975 and 1976 taxable years, they were entitled to file as
single individuals for those years, thereby avoiding the marriage pen-
alty. The Internal Revenue Service maintained that they were married
individuals during those years because the foreign divorces would not
be recognized as valid in Maryland, since the foreign courts did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings and the taxpayers
made material misrepresentations to the foreign court.00 Additionally,
the Service argued that even if the divorce decrees were recognized as
valid for state law purposes, they should be disregarded for federal in-
come tax purposes because they amounted to sham transactions.'0 '
Although there was no statutory guidance and no clear decision from
Maryland's highest court, the Tax Court agreed with the Service that
Maryland would not recognize the foreign divorces because the foreign
courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court, adhering to the
view that state-defined marital status is controlling for tax purposes,
noted that Maryland's recognition of the Boyters' Haitian and Domini-
can divorces would be governed by principles of comity which required
the foreign tribunals to obtain jurisdiction to render the judgments.
recognition of a common law marriage and therefore could not file a joint return as
husband and wife.
" 74 T.C. 989 (1980), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981).
" The Boyters admitted that their divorces were undertaken solely to reduce their
tax liability. Brief for Petitioners at 10, Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980)
(copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
.o The Internal Revenue Service argued that the Boyters falsely and intentionally
deceived the foreign tribunals in establishing grounds for their divorces. Brief for Re-
spondent at 23-30, Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (copy on file at U.C.
Davis Law Review office).
101 74 T.C. at 993.
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Domicile of one of the spouses in the foreign jurisdiction is generally a
prerequisite to recognition of a foreign court's divorce decree. Since the
Boyters at all times resided and were domiciled in Maryland, the Tax
Court reasoned that Maryland's highest court would not recognize the
foreign divorces as valid terminations of the marriage.'0 2 This disposi-
tion of the case made it unnecessary to consider the Service's contention
that the divorces should be disregarded as shams.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court
to consider whether the divorces, even if valid under state law, should
be disregarded for federal tax purposes. The court began by noting its
agreement with the principle that state law controls the determination
of marital status for tax purposes. However, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that Maryland law was ambiguous regarding the validity of mi-
gratory divorces obtained in a foreign country. The court considered
using Maryland's certification procedure to ask the state court of ap-
peals to determine the validity of the divorces but decided, based upon
considerations of comity, not to invoke the process. The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that a Maryland court ruling would not dispose of the case if
the state court ruled the foreign divorces were valid since it would still
be necessary to consider the Service's contention that the divorces were
shams."'" Thus, it was necessary to address whether the divorces could
be disregarded even if valid.
The Fourth Circuit then considered the applicability of the sham
transaction doctrine to divorces. It noted that the doctrine had been
used by courts to disregard the form of commercial transactions to ap-
ply the tax laws to the substance or economic reality of a transaction,
and held the same principles applicable to divorces. Additionally, the
court found support for its position in cases disregarding the liquidation
of a corporation which subsequently reincorporates and continues
operations:'04
102 Id. at 995-97
103 668 F.2d at 1385.
10 The court cited three cases: Rose v. United States, 640 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1981)
(purported liquidation of a corporation was an I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization;
demonstration of a valid business purpose for the sale and liquidation does not change
the classification); Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.) (liquida-
tion-reincorporation was in fact an I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization; tax avoidance
motive does not have to be demonstrated), cert. denied sub nom. Schaffan v. Commis-
sioner, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); and Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th
Cir. 1965) (a complete liquidation when corporate assets were sold to an unrelated
purchaser and business was not resumed for over one year), overruled in different part,
Of Course, Inc. v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974).
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The underlying purpose of the transaction, viewed as a whole, is for the
taxpayers to remain effectively married while avoiding the marriage pen-
alty in the tax laws. It is the prompt remarriage that defeats the apparent
divorce when assessing the taxpayers' liability, just as the prompt
reincorporation of a business enterprise in continuous operation defeats
the apparent liquidation of the predecessor corporation.'5
The court went on to state the standard it thought applicable: "Thus,
the sham transaction doctrine may apply in this case if, as the record
suggests, the parties intended merely to procure divorce papers rather
than actually to effect a real dissolution of their marriage contract."' 6
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Tax Court, as trier of fact, was
the only body competent to make this determination." 7
The Service's attempts in Revenue Ruling 76-255 and Boyter to pre-
vent manipulation of the Code's provisions through tax-motivated di-
vorces are appropriate. The marriage penalty is a product of competing
goals: (1) taxing all married couples equally regardless of the source of
income within the marital unit; and (2) designing rate schedules so that
a single individual pays a tax which is not significantly greater than the
tax imposed upon a married couple with the same amount of taxable
income. ' By adopting new rate schedules in 1969 to reduce the differ-
ence between the rates paid by single and married persons, Congress
required married couples to pay more total tax than two single persons
each earning approximately one-half of the couples' income. This result
was justified by a comparison of living expenses incurred by a married
couple relative to single persons. A married couple is likely to have
living expenses which are greater than a single person with the same
income, and, therefore, the couple should pay less tax. But, since a
married couple can typically live for less than two single persons living
apart, it was thought that the married taxpayers should pay more tax
than two single persons, each having one-half the couple's income.' '
105 Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1387.
I06 d. (footnote omitted). The court stated that evidence that the taxpayers may have
practiced fraud upon the courts granting the divorces is relevant to their intention. Id.
at n.7.
101 Id. at 1388.
' 1980 JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 3, at 23-24, 26-27; FEDERAL TAXATION,
supra note 11, at 1 111.3.5; Bittker, supra note 4, at 1429-31.
"' STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., lST
SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1969 223 (Comm.
Print 1970); Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both
Spouses are Working: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1972) (statement of Representative Schwengel); 1980 JOINT
COMM. PRINT, supra note 3, at 24. For the view that Congress did not realize that its
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Some commentators have been less certain that a discernable policy
justification exists for the marriage penalty,"' but that does not man-
date recognition of tax-motivated divorces. Congress clearly did not in-
tend application of the tax rate schedules to be elective; the Service's
position in Revenue Ruling 76-255 and Boyter is consistent with that
goal. When Congress created new rate schedules for single persons in
1969, the pre-1969 rate schedule for single persons was retained for
married persons filing separately. Otherwise, if each spouse were al-
lowed to use the new schedules for single persons, couples in commu-
nity property states could be taxed at rates lower than if they filed
jointly."' This result would undercut the policy that couples with equal
incomes should pay equal taxes. 12
C. Manipulation of State-Defined Marital Status
To prevent manipulation of the tax laws, the Service in Revenue
Ruling 76-255 and the Fourth Circuit in Boyter were willing to aban-
don the principle that local law determines marital status for federal
tax purposes. This is a positive analytical step since state-defined mari-
tal status is potentially susceptible to manipulation and continued reli-
ance upon state definitions of marriage could compromise tax policy
and produce unprincipled results.
The potential for manipulation of marital status is indicated in
Boyter. Despite the Fourth Circuit's concern regarding Maryland law,
Boyter involved facts which did not seriously challenge the traditional
view that state-defined marital status determines marital status for tax
purposes. Since the Boyters resided in Maryland at all times and the
Haitian and Dominican decrees acknowledged the Boyters' Maryland
1969 changes would result in the marriage penalty, see Note, The Haitian Vacation:
The Applicability of Sham Doctrine to Year-End Divorces, 77 MicH. L. REV. 1332,
1346-47 (1979) [hereafter Note, The Haitian Vacation].
,1' See, e.g., Gerzog, supra note 36, at 31-36; Mess, supra note 36, at 96-99. The
legislative history of the marriage penalty has led one commentator to suggest that there
is insufficient evidence of congressional intent to impose the marriage penalty to war-
rant application of the sham transaction doctrine to year-end divorces. Note, The Hai-
tian Vacation, supra note 109, at 1344-48.
"' 1980 JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 3, at 24.
12 Also, the Code's focus upon marital status at year-end does not support the
Boyters' position that temporary changes in marital status should be recognized for tax
purposes. See Brief for Petitioners at 10, Supplemental Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3,
Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review
office). Year-end marital status is adopted for purposes of administrative convenience,
not to facilitate manipulation of the income tax.
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residence, the Tax Court could use state-defined marital status to reach
its decision and avoid the more difficult policy considerations involved
in the case. If the decrees had contained a finding of domicile in the
foreign jurisdiction, it would have been much more difficult for the Tax
Court to conclude that Maryland would not recognize the decrees as
valid.
Moreover, a small but increasing number of states have determined
that domicile is not always a prerequisite to the recognition of a divorce
decree rendered in a foreign jurisdiction. If state definitions of marital
status are controlling for tax purposes, manipulation of Code provisions
would be even easier in these jurisdictions. In Boyter, the Tax Court
noted that New York has extended recognition to a Mexican divorce
proceeding when both spouses participated before the foreign tribu-
nal," 3 but concluded that Maryland would not follow this authority.
The Tax Court was apparently not aware of recent authority in Ten-
nessee and Connecticut indicating that domicile of one spouse is not
necessary for recognition of a bilateral divorce decree rendered in a for-
eign country if neither party to the action was prejudiced." 4 For exam-
ple, in Hyde v. Hyde,"' Eleanor Hyde traveled to the Dominican Re-
public in 1974 to obtain a divorce from her husband, Joseph, who was
represented by counsel and entered a general appearance in the action.
Both of the Hydes were residents of Tennessee at the time of the di-
vorce and obtained the foreign divorce to avoid the extensive delay in




Two years later, Joseph brought a Tennessee action to obtain a de-
claratory judgment validating the Dominican Republic decree or, alter-
natively, a divorce. Eleanor answered by requesting that the divorce be
recognized. Thus, both parties supported the decree and neither ques-
tioned the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal. A Tennessee divorce refe-
"' Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966). The Tax Court declined to consider how a New
York court would view the Boyters' divorce. Boyter, 74 T.C. at 999 n.13.
.. Yoder v. Yoder, 31 Conn. Supp. 345, 330 A.2d 825 (1974) (dictum); Terrell v.
Terrell, 578 S.W.2d 637 (Tenn. 1979); Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978).
In Boyter, the Tax Court stated that only New York extended recognition to foreign
divorces if both spouses participated in the proceeding. 74 T.C. at 998-99. However,
the Internal Revenue Service acknowledged that Connecticut and the Virgin Islands
also recognize a foreign divorce when neither spouse was domiciled in the foreign juris-
diction. Brief for Respondent at 17, Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (copy
on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
,, 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978).
,,6 Id. at 195.
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ree, however, entered the action to contest the decree's validity."'
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted comity to the divorce, con-
cluding that the grounds upon which the decree was granted were not
offensive to Tennessee's public policies. Regarding the absence of Do-
minican Republic domicile by either party, the court weighed the
state's traditional interest in the marital status of its domiciles against
its interest in permitting an exit from broken relationships. The court
concluded that comity should be extended to the decree." 8 The Tennes-
see Supreme Court has also recognized a bilateral Haitian divorce de-
cree which contained no provision for alimony to prevent the wife from
later pursuing a state court action in Tennessee for alimony.''
If the Boyters had traveled to another state, rather than to a foreign
country, and obtained a bilateral divorce, their chances for a successful
divorce would have been greatly improved. In Sherrer v. Sherrer," the
Supreme Court required Massachusetts to extend full faith and credit
to a Florida divorce decree which found Margaret Sherrer to be a Flor-
ida resident. Margaret's husband, Edward, had been a party to the
Florida action but had not challenged the jurisdictional issue of Mar-
garet's domicile in that forum. Later, Edward instituted a Massachu-
setts action to have the Florida decree declared invalid. The Court con-
cluded that the requirements of full faith and credit barred Edward
from collaterally attacking the Florida decree on jurisdictional grounds
in another state after having had a full opportunity to contest the juris-
dictional issue. 2' Subsequently, in Johnson v. Muelberger,"' the Su-
preme Court extended Sherrer to preclude collateral attack of the di-
vorce decree by individuals not parties to the divorce action.
If the Boyters resided in a state which adopted the Tennessee or
New York approach with respect to divorce decrees rendered in foreign
jurisdictions, or if one of the Boyters had fulfilled the residency re-
quirements for divorce in another state prior to obtaining a bilateral
divorce, the Tax Court would have had difficulty concluding they were
still married. Perhaps a court might conclude that the Boyters' plan to
remarry distinguishes cases such as Hyde, since a state has no interest
in permitting an easy exit from an ongoing relationship. But the likeli-
117 Id.
,, Id. at 197-98.
11, Terrell v. Terrell, 578 S.W.2d 637 (Tenn. 1979).
120 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
121 Id. at 351.
122 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (daughter by her father's first marriage could not contest the
validity of her father's Florida divorce from his second wife on jurisdictional grounds to
prevent his third wife from electing to take a statutory share of his estate).
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hood of a taxpayer victory would be increased significantly if the court
was bound by state law concepts of marriage. Strict adherence to state-
defined marital status will increase the potential for manipulation of
the Code and compromise tax policy. New federal standards must be
adopted to replace or reinforce state-defined marital status as a tax fac-
tor. Until new standards are adopted, courts must use flexible analyti-
cal approaches when determining a taxpayer's marital status.
D. Sham Transaction Doctrine
Undoubtedly anticipating the weaknesses of state-defined marital sta-
tus, the Service uses the sham transaction doctrine in Revenue Ruling
76-255 to avoid giving tax effect to a valid divorce. Likewise, the
Fourth Circuit made it clear that sham analysis may be used to disre-
gard a valid divorce followed by remarriage. However, the Service's
sham theory in Revenue Ruling 76-255 has been criticized by commen-
tators.' 3 Transactions are generally disregarded as shams when a court
concludes that they possess no appreciable economic substance beyond
their tax consequences.' 2 For example, taxpayers have been denied in-
terest deductions when a court concluded that the loan did not have
"purpose, substance, or utility apart from [its] anticipated tax conse-
quences."'2 5 Under this standard, if a valid year-end divorce was ac-
companied by significant nontax effects, it should be immune from at-
tack as a sham.
In Boyter the nontax effects of the divorces appear to be quite signifi-
cant. The Boyters were divorced for 32 days in 1975-76, and for 79
days in 1976-77. As a consequence of their divorces, the Boyters argued
they forfeited claims to survivor annuities under the federal civil service
system, lost potential estate tax benefits during the period they were
223 See, e.g., Feld, Divorce, Tax Style, 54 TAxEs 608 (1976); Note, The Haitian
Vacation, supra note 109. The sham argument, as articulated by the Internal Revenue
Service in Boyter, was really a combination of the substance-over-form doctrine, the
business purpose doctrine, and the step transaction doctrine. Brief for Respondent at
30-42, Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law
Review office).
22 Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1960) (taxpayer was not allowed
to deduct interest paid at a 3.5% rate on nonrecourse loans secured by 2.5% deferred
annuity bonds; taxpayer would prepay interest and immediately borrow cash or loan
values created by interest payments). Judge Widener, dissenting in the Fourth Circuit's
Boyter opinion, found it remarkable that the majority did not discuss Knetsch in its
opinion. 668 F.2d at 1389 (Widener, J., dissenting).




unmarried, altered the ownership of marital property, and destroyed
various legal rights available to married couples under state law.,2 6
Thus, if the divorces were valid under state law, there is a serious
question whether they could be classified as shams, since they would be
accompanied by significant nontax consequences.
Moreover, Judge Widener, dissenting in the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Boyter, disagreed with the majority's analysis of the sham issue.
Noting that the issue was one of first impression, the Judge questioned
whether a valid state law divorce could be labeled a sham for tax pur-
poses. "' 7 The Judge based his dissent upon an earlier decision by the
Fourth Circuit applying sham transaction analysis:
If there is, under the realities of the terms of the transaction, some reason-
able hope of the transaction appreciably affecting the taxpayers' beneficial
interest other than by a tax reduction, the transaction would not be a
sham for tax purposes. Furthermore, if there is, under the realities of the
terms of the transaction, some real risk of loss to the taxpayer, other than
whatever loss might be actually built in (as it was in the instant [Bridges]
case), the transaction would not be a sham for tax purposes."'
Judge Widener concluded that the determinative tax question,
whether "what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing the
statute intended," could only be answered after determining the validity
of the divorces.'29 Despite the Fourth Circuit's assertion to the contrary,
there remains a serious question whether a divorce valid under state
law may be considered a sham and disregarded for tax purposes.
Even if tax-motivated divorces may be disregarded as shams, admin-
istrative considerations mandate a more certain approach. Marital sta-
tus affects many tax provisions and should be easily determined. Tax-
payers and the government should be able to ascertain matters such as
filing status, applicable rate schedule and operation of provisions which
depend upon marital status without having to consider questions of in-
tent and purpose or measuring the nontax effects of short-lived di-
vorces. Sham analysis may be appropriate to prevent subversion of tax
policy in particular cases, but it is not appropriate as a solution to the
broader problems represented by Revenue Ruling 76-255 and Boyter.
New federal standards should be designed to replace or reinforce state-
126 Brief for Petitioner at 19-24, Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980) (copy
on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
"' 668 F.2d at 1388 (Widener, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1389 (citations omitted). The quotation is from Bridges v. Commissioner,
325 F.2d 180, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1963) (deduction for interest paid on loans secured by
treasury notes disallowed; taxpayer could not expect a profit absent tax deduction).
" 668 F.2d at 1389 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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defined marital status as an operative tax factor. These new standards
must be tailored to promote tax policy, prevent manipulation, and be
definite enough to be efficiently administered.
Revenue Ruling 76-255, Boyter, and Private Ruling 7835076 indi-
cate the increasing weakness of state-defined marital status as an opera-
tive tax factor. Revenue Ruling 76-255 and Boyter demonstrate that a
group of taxpayers, albeit small, is willing to engage in year-end shifts
in marital status to obtain tax benefits. These strategies may be success-
ful if state definitions of marriage are determinative for tax purposes.
Private Ruling 7835076 carries an even more disturbing message. It
presents a couple willing to permanently alter their marital status to
obtain tax advantages. Neither trend is desirable. Alteration of marital
status for tax purposes adversely impacts both the tax law and mar-
riage, and mandates a shift in marriage's role in the income tax. In the
section which follows, this Article will detail possible approaches for
change.
IV. THE TAX FUTURE OF STATE-DEFINED MARITAL STATUS
The increasing weakness of marital status as an operative tax factor
presents serious issues for the income tax. Marriage's role in the Code
is undercut to the extent the status is manipulated and loses meaning.
Long-term adjustments in the relationship between the tax law and
state-defined marital status will occur if present trends continue. To the
extent tax provisions are compromised, the importance of local law con-
cepts of marriage in the income tax must be reduced.
As a matter of long-term tax policy, marriage's role in the tax law
could be reduced in two different ways. Marital status could be aban-
doned and replaced with expanded and more flexible standards
designed to identify economic relationships similar to traditional mar-
riage. A less drastic approach would be to identify quasi-marital rela-
tionships and tax the individuals as if they were married. 3 ' Alterna-
tively, the income tax could focus more closely upon the individual
taxpayer by eliminating the Code's emphasis upon marital status as a
taxing factor. 3 ' These options rekindle debate about the extent to
which personal economic relationships should affect an individual's tax
liability.
Since 1948, the income tax has viewed a married couple as a single
130 See infra text accompanying notes 133-43.
"' Professor Gann and others have argued for marriage neutrality because of the
similarity between marriage and other relationships. See Gann, supra note 35, at 25-
290 [Vol. 17:257
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economic unit for purposes of assessing tax liability. Various other pro-
visions have also treated married taxpayers as a single taxpaying entity.
Movement from the present structure will renew theoretical debate
concerning the appropriate taxable unit with several significant varia-
tions. The first problem for those advocating recognition of sharing re-
lationships outside of marriage will be to obtain agreement upon the
nature of the standard to replace marriage. What would be the bounda-
ries of any new classification? For example, would the standard be lim-
ited to two person groups or would sharing arrangements in larger
groups be recognized for tax purposes? Would same-sex couples, who
have historically not been permitted to marry," ' be included within the
new definition? How long would a sharing relationship have to exist
before being recognized for tax purposes?
Professor Wolk has suggested one possible approach for identifying
sharing relationships similar to marriage. He advocates recognition of
"domestic partnerships" - relationships sufficiently marital in nature
to be recognized for tax purposes. 13  Professor Wolk suggests that a
domestic partnership be defined in terms of the elements proposed by
Folberg and Buren as a basis for determining property settlements be-
tween unmarried couples:
I. An actual family relationship, evidenced by (A) cohabiting adults, and
(B) the acknowledgement and acceptance of mutual rights, duties, and ob-
ligations toward one another;
II. An ostensible family relationship, demonstrated by evidence that
others perceive, or had reason to perceive, the parties' relationship as fa-
milial; and
III. A durable, family relationship evidenced by a domestic union which
was in existence for a substantial period of cohabitation."'
Professor Wolk also suggests that recognition be limited to domestic
partnerships in existence for a substantial period of time, such as three
years, and that the domestic partnership concept include same-sex
couples."'
The social security laws provide an alternative standard for identify-
ing quasi-marital relationships. Certain nonmarital relationships are
2 See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1973) (a relationship
between two female persons is not a "marriage" so that issuance of a marriage license
is not authorized); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (state
statutes required and state and federal constitutions permitted denial of a marriage
license to two male applicants).
' Wolk, supra note 16, at 1267-68.
I d. at 1268.
Id. at 1268-69.
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recognized for determining eligibility and benefits under the federal
program providing supplemental security income for aged, blind, and
disabled individuals. "6 These provisions provide an approach which
could be adapted to federal tax law. Even though state law generally
determines marital status, a man and a woman are deemed married for
purposes of supplemental security income if they "are found to be hold-
ing themselves out to the community in which they reside as husband
and wife." 1" Indicia bearing upon this question include: (1) the names
the individuals use; (2) whether the individuals introduce one another
as husband and wife; (3) who owns or rents the place where the couple
lives; and (4) whether documents such as deeds, leases, time payment
papers and tax records show the parties as husband and wife.'38
Couples considered married under this standard are deemed divorced
after they have lived apart for six full months.1"
While not a complete solution to the problem, tax recognition of
nonmarital relationships constituting domestic partnerships or in which
the parties hold themselves out as married would end disparate treat-
ment of this group of essentially marital relationships. It would also
help reduce manipulation of marital status to obtain tax benefits, since
a shift in marital status which is not accompanied by an objective mani-
festation of some change in the relationship would not alter the couples'
tax results. Married taxpayers, contemplating a divorce for tax savings,
would have to take steps to alter the public perception of their relation-
ship in addition to obtaining a state law divorce. The taxpayers in Pri-
vate Ruling 7835076 might have to use different names, change the
ownership of their property, and publicly acknowledge their new status
to be considered single for tax purposes. Taxpayers may be reluctant to
pursue this strategy since it requires significant changes in the nature
of their relationship.
However, if a standard replacing marriage or identifying quasi-mari-
tal relationships could muster a consensus, serious problems would nev-
1,6 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2) (1976).
Id. Being married can reduce the couple's total benefits if they are both "eligible
spouses." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(b), 1382c(b) (1976). Certain "deemed marriages" are also
recognized under the old age, survivors, and disability. insurance provisions. Generally,
applicants are deemed to be married if they live together and can establish that they
went through a marriage ceremony in good faith which would have been valid, but for
an unknown legal impediment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(1)(B), 1382c(d)(1) (1976).
" .20 C.F.R. § 416.1826(c) (1983). The same regulation creates a presumption that
couples living together will be considered married unless they demonstrate they do not
lead people to believe they are husband and wife.
' 20 C.F.R. § 416.1832(d) (1983).
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ertheless remain. Any standard replacing or supporting marriage as an
indicator of economic circumstance must be administrable with relative
ease and a high degree of effectiveness. This is a difficult burden to
satisfy. A new standard would, like marriage, produce tax benefits on
some occasions and result in tax penalties in others. For example, a
joint return might reduce the total taxes of the members of a domestic
partnership in one year, while filing separate returns as single individ-
uals would save taxes in a different year. Administration of the tax
structure would require identification of economic sharing relationships
in both situations. This would be an extremely difficult task without an
intrusive investigation into the couples' personal living arrangement.
Tax recognition of quasi-marital relationships will require a substan-
tial and likely intolerable administrative presence, or result in increased
manipulation of tax provisions.
Advocates of limited recognition of cohabitation relationships have
acknowledged these administrative difficulties.'"0 In urging recognition
of domestic partnerships for tax purposes, Professor Wolk argues that
similar administrative difficulties exist regarding common law mar-
riages, yet they are recognized by the tax law."" However, the strength
of this argument depends, at least in part, upon the potential number of
domestic partnerships recognized for tax purposes. If the number of
domestic partnerships were large in comparison to the number of com-
mon law marriages, the administrative burden would be significantly
increased. Professor Wolk also leaves open the possibility that domestic
partnerships could be recognized for purposes of excluding wealth
transfers between cohabitants from gross income and ignored for deter-
mining filing status.142 This approach would greatly reduce administra-
tive concerns but would not be responsive to the problems represented
by Boyter, since year-end marital status could still be manipulated to
obtain tax advantages." 3 Thus, given the potential difficulty in creating
and administering replacement or supportive standards for marriage,
movement toward a more marriage-neutral income tax seems the most
likely long-term structural response if present trends regarding mar-
riage continue.
Movement toward marriage neutrality would revive the issue of
whether community property laws should be given effect for tax pur;
240 Wolk, supra note 16, at 1270-71, 1274-75.
Id. at 1270-71.
I42 d. at 1274-75.
1' Professor Wolk recognizes that manipulation by unmarried cohabitants is a possi-
ble result of recognizing domestic partnerships for tax filing purposes. Id.
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poses. Congress, when it addressed the marriage penalty in the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, chose to disregard the effect of com-
munity property laws. The deduction available for two-earner married
couples is computed on a base which is essentially equal to the lower
earning spouse's earned income determined without reference to com-
munity property laws."' This approach is proper in view of Boyter and
trends concerning marriage. If community property laws respecting
earned income are given effect for tax purposes, state-defined marital
status would retain a good deal of significance, even in an ostensibly
marriage-neutral tax system. Married couples in a community property
state would again reap the benefits of income splitting with respect to
salaries and wages and year-end marriages by single taxpayers would
be an effective tax saving strategy.
Community property laws concerning income from property could be
given effect in a tax structure responding to the weaknesses of state-
defined marriage. Income from property can be shifted between unmar-
ried taxpayers through transfers of the underlying property.' There-
fore, shifts in marital status would not provide benefits different from
those currently available to all taxpayers willing to alter the ownership
of property.
Despite the trends concerning marriage, fundamental shifts in the
relationship between the tax law and marriage are not likely to occur
in the near future. Marriage's continuing viability as an institution
makes rapid change doubtful. Broad based responses to the problems
posed by Revenue Ruling 76-255, Boyter, and Private Ruling 7835076
must be tailored to long-term developments, which militates against an
immediate major revision in marriage's role in the income tax. Some
state courts have rejected legal trends blurring the nature of marital
and nonmarital relationships.' 4 6 Also, the lack of litigated cases involv-
ing year-end divorces indicates that the vast majority of taxpayers do
not attempt these strategies. Instead of major revision, the most likely
responses to the weaknesses of state-defined marital status will be en-
actment of legislation designed to reduce the tax significance of local
" I.R.C. § 221(b)(1).
4 See, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 12 (1937) (assignments of portions
of the beneficial interest in a trust were effective to shift taxation of the related income);
FEDERAL TAXATION, supra note 11, at 75.3.
'4' E.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Il. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (1979) (claim
brought by cohabitant for an equal share of profits and properties accumulated during
the relationship was contrary to public policy and unenforceable); see also Rehak v.
Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 543, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1977) (cohabitation constitutes immoral
consideration and will not support a claim for equitable relief).
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law definitions of marriage and adoption by courts of policy-based ap-
proaches to analyze tax-motivated divorces.
A. Legislative Responses to the Weaknesses of State-Defined Marital
Status
Legislative responses to the problems posed by current trends con-
cerning marriage will likely come in two forms: (1) particular Code
provisions will be modified as taxpayers attempt tax-motivated divorces
to reap tax benefits or marriage-based tax distinctions are perceived to
be inequitable; and (2) state-defined marital status will be reinforced
by federal standards as an operative tax factor.
The recent change concerning the marriage penalty is an example of
the first form of response. Congress adjusted the tax burden of two-
earner married couples relative to one-earner couples and single tax-
payers. Future additional changes are therefore probable. One would
hope this legislative effort is indicative of increased sensitivity to dispa-
rate treatment of various taxpaying units. A pattern of intermittent
change in various Code provisions is a likely response to the weaknesses
of state-defined marital status.
State-defined marital status should also be reinforced by federal stan-
dards to reduce the likelihood of manipulation. Congress should adopt
new federal standards which would reduce the importance of year-end
marital status. One fairly simple solution would be to determine tax
marital status based upon marital status for a majority of the year,
rather than at year-end. Taxpayers married for six months or less
would be deemed to be single while those married over one-half of the
year would be considered married. Under this approach, the Boyters
would have been considered married for tax purposes despite valid
year-end divorces. Alternatively, divorces followed by remarriage
within some established period of time could be disregarded for tax
purposes. This solution is more directly addressed to tax-motivated di-
vorces since year-end marital status would continue to be determinative
for the vast majority of taxpayers.147
Divorces following marriages lasting less than some reasonable pe-
riod, such as one year, could also be accorded special status within the
Code. Recognition could be denied to such divorces for the purpose of
applying the income splitting provisions of sections 71 and 215. This
approach would be similar to the Code's wash sales provision, which
"'I One writer has suggested nullifying for tax purposes a divorce and remarriage
between the same individuals. Feld, supra note 123, at 612.
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disallows losses from the sale of a security if the taxpayer purchases the
same security within a certain time period. 48 The loss is disregarded
because the related sale leaves the taxpayer's investment in the security
undisturbed. Similarly, marriages or divorces of very short duration
could be ignored and treated as not disturbing the taxpayer's original
marital status.
There is precedent supporting adoption of federal statutory standards
for marital status. For purposes of federal old age, survivors, and disa-
bility insurance benefits, marital status is generally determined under
state law.' 9 However, the terms "wife" and "husband" are defined so
as to disregard, in certain situations, marriages lasting less than one
year.'5° Also, the terms "divorced wife," "widow," and "widower" are
defined to include duration-of-relationship requirements. 5 ' These re-
,,8 I.R.C. § 1091.
' 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1976).
IS0 42 U.S.C. § 416(b), (f) (Supp. V 1981). Section 416(b) defines "wife":
The term "wife" means the wife of an individual, but only if she (1) is
the mother of his son or daughter, (2) was married to him for a period of
not less than one year immediately preceding the day on which her appli-
cation is filed, or (3) in the month prior to the month of her marriage to
him (A) was entitled to, or on application therefor and attainment of age
62 in such prior month would have been entitled to, benefits under subsec-
tion (b), (e), or (h) of section 402 of this title, (B) had attained age eight-
een and was entitled to, or on application therefor would have been enti-
tled to, benefits under subsection (d) of such section (subject, however, to
section 402(s) of this title), or (C) was entitled to, or upon application
therefor and attainment of the required age (if any) would have been enti-
tled to, a widow's, child's (after attainment of age 18), or parent's insur-
ance annuity under section 231a of title 45. For purposes of clause (2), a
wife shall be deemed to have been married to an individual for a period of
one year throughout the month in which occurs the first anniversary of
her marriage to such individual. For purposes of subparagraph (C) of sec-
tion 402(b)(1) of this title, a divorced wife shall be deemed not to be mar-
ried throughout the month in which she becomes divorced.
A similar definition of "husband" is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 416().
1" 42 U.S.C. § 416(d)(1), (c), (g) (Supp. V 1981). Some of these duration-of-rela-
tionship standards are incorporated into the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974. 45
U.S.C. § 231a(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The nine-month marriage requirement in
the definitions of "widow" and "widower" in § 416 is waived if the spouse dies acci-
dentally or in the line of duty in the armed services. The durational requirement is also
waived if the widow or widower was previously married to the individual and subse-
quently divorced and the nine-month requirement would have been satisfied if the prior
marriage had been terminated by death. 42 U.S.C. § 416(k) (1976). In Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld the nine-month durational re-
quirement against constitutional challenge.
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quirements are designed to prevent abuses of the program and promote
efficient administration. In affirming the constitutionality of these types
of provisions, the Supreme Court recognized the potential benefits of
federal standards regarding marital status:
[Tihe duration-of-relationship requirement represents not merely a sub-
stantive policy determination that benefits should be awarded only on the
basis of genuine marital relationships, but also a substantive policy deter-
mination that limited resources would not be well spent in making indi-
vidual determinations. It is an expression of Congress' policy choice that
the Social Security system, and its millions of beneficiaries, would be best
served by a prophylactic rule which bars claims arising from the bulk of
sham marriages which are actually entered, which discourages such mar-
riages from ever taking place, and which is also objective and easily
administered."'
Similarly, for deportation purposes, a marriage is ignored if it is en-
tered into less than two years prior to entry of the alien and is judi-
cially annulled or terminated within two years subsequent to entry, un-
less the alien establishes that the marriage was not for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws.1" In each of these situations, local law
concepts of marriage have been reinforced by federal standards to pre-
vent manipulation of marital status and promote the effective operation
of the statute. The increasing weakness of state-defined marital status
as an operative tax factor requires that similar provisions be enacted as
part of the Internal Revenue Code.
These approaches are not, however, responsive to the problems rep-
resented by Private Ruling 7835076. Married taxpayers willing to per-
manently alter their marital status would be single individuals for tax
purposes. A special standard could be adopted to test divorces to see if
they represent a real change in the parties' relationship, but that would
result in different treatment of cohabitants depending solely upon
whether they were previously married. Taxpayers who live together
and have never been married would be considered single while taxpay-
ers in the same situation would be deemed married because of their
previous marriage. This difference is too tenuous to base tax distinc-
tions upon so long as marriage remains the operative tax factor in the
Internal Revenue Code. Complete elimination of the marriage penalty,
adoption of a replacement or supportive standard for marriage, or
movement toward a marriage-neutral income tax is needed to eliminate
the incentive for divorce in Private Ruling 7835076.
"I Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 784-85 (1975).
.13 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976).
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B. Judicial Responses to Tax-Motivated Divorces
In the absence of legislation dealing with shifts in marital status, the
courts must be willing to introduce a greater degree of flexibility into
the process of determining tax marital status. As demonstrated, rigid
adherence to local law determinations of marital status must give way
to prevent manipulation of Code provisions. In view of the potential
weakness in the sham analysis,154 new approaches which focus upon
tax policy must be devised by the courts.
Precedent exists to support this approach. Controversies have arisen
over the effect of an annulment or an invalid divorce upon tax marital
status.'55 In the majority of these situations, the courts and the Internal
Revenue Service have had to decide the tax effect of a marriage subse-
quently determined to be defective and, therefore, invalid. Not surpris-
ingly, precedent is inconsistent in both approach and result.'56 A review
of this authority indicates principles which could be used in dealing
with tax-motivated divorces.
The Service and a majority of courts considering the effect of an an-
nulment or divorce decree upon tax marital status have focused upon
the local law effect of the decree; if the decree is effective under state
law it will be effective for tax purposes.' For example, in Revenue
' See supra text accompanying notes 123-29.
E.g., Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) (considering
the consequences of a Mexican divorce declared invalid by a New York court), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552 (1975) (considering
the tax effects of a Mexican divorce treated as a nullity by the parties), affd per
curiam, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977); Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457
(1974) (determining the tax effects of an annulment), acq. 1974-2 C.B. 3; Rev. Rul.
76-255, 1976-1 C.B. 40 (situation 1: determining the filing status of a couple whose
marriage was annulled under a decree declaring that no valid marriage ever existed);
Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65 (setting forth the Service's position regarding di-
vorces subsequently declared invalid).
"I6 Compare Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) (Mexi-
can divorce, declared invalid by a New York court, was recognized for tax purposes),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966) with Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552 (1975)
(Mexican divorce, which was not recognized under California law, did not terminate
the husband's marriage to his first wife so he and his second wife were not married and
could not file a joint return), affd per curiam, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977).
"' Controversy has surrounded the treatment of interlocutory divorce decrees. For
example, in Eccles v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1049, affd per curiam, 208 F.2d 796
(4th Cir. 1953), the state court issued an interlocutory divorce decree on August 2,
1949 which was to become absolute six months later. The issue in the case was
whether the taxpayers could file a joint return in 1949. Looking to local law, the Tax
Court determined that the interlocutory decree did not operate as a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance and, therefore, the parties remained married for tax purposes
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Ruling 76-255,s8 the Service considered the tax effect of a 1976 decree
annulling a 1975 marriage and concluded that since a valid marriage
never existed, the individuals were, at all times, single for tax purposes.
Courts have adopted a similar analytical approach when considering
the effect of migratory divorces subsequently declared invalid. ' 9 In Un-
during 1949. The Internal Revenue Service initially refused to follow Eccles. Rev. Rul.
55-178, 1955-1 C.B. 322. After again litigating and losing on the issue in Commis-
sioner v. Ostler, 237 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1956), the Service agreed to change its position
and to follow Eccles. Rev. Rul. 57-368, 1957-2 C.B. 896. However, an appeal from a
final decree of divorce will generally not permit the taxpayers to file jointly pending the
outcome of the appeal. See Sullivan v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 71 (1957), affd, 256
F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1958).
Wisconsin law presents a variation of these questions. In Wisconsin, it is unlawful
for a person who has been a party to a divorce action to marry again within six months
after the judgment of divorce is granted. The divorce is effective immediately, subject to
the court's power to vacate or modify the judgment upon its own motion or at the
request of both of the parties during the six-month period. In Rev. Rul. 79-330, 1979-2
C.B. 391, the Service held that since the judgment is a final decree, a husband and wife
divorced under Wisconsin law cannot file jointly for a taxable year ending within the
six-month period.
* '' 1976-2 C.B. 40 (situation 1).
,' The issue generally arises when the invalidating jurisdiction is different from the
jurisdiction that granted the divorce decree. If the jurisdiction that granted the divorce
declares the divorce invalid, the divorce is not recognized for tax purposes. Estate of
Buckley v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 664 (1962).
The Internal Revenue Service, in an effort to protect the federal fisc, has followed a
path which allows it the greatest flexibility when dealing with invalidated divorces. In
G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2 C.B. 32, the Service examined the tax consequences of a Mexi-
can divorce which, it was concluded, would not be recognized under state law. The
memorandum held that since the parties had obtained the divorce in good faith and
there was no tax avoidance motive, the Mexican decree would be recognized'for pur-
poses of the Code's alimony provisions.
G.C.M. 25250 was reexamined in Rev. Rul. 57-113, 1957-1 C.B. 106. In that rul-
ing, a husband obtained a Mexican divorce and, immediately thereafter, his former
wife brought a state court action contesting the validity of the Mexican divorce, re-
questing a legal separation, and asking for a support allowance pending the outcome of
the suit. Support was granted and the ruling's issue was whether the husband was
entitled to deduct those payments. The payments were deductible only if the prior di-
vorce was invalid. Otherwise the marital relationship would have been previously ter-
minated and the payments would not satisfy the statutory requirement that they be
made while the parties are separated and pursuant to a decree. The Service held that
the payments were deductible, distinguishing G.C.M. 25250 by focusing upon the sub-
sequent state decree. The Service concluded that G.C.M. 25250 "was not intended to
recognize the Mexican decree over subsequent decrees in other jurisdictions." 1957-1
C.B. at 107.
In Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65, the Service considered facts similar to Estate of
Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) (husband's Mexican divorce from
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termann v. Commissioner,6o Sally Cheney obtained a Nevada divorce
from her first husband by substituted service of process and immedi-
ately married John Untermann. Sally and John lived in New Jersey
until 1953, when John obtained a divorce decree from Sally in Juarez,
Mexico. Shortly thereafter, John married Sarah Kaltman in Connecti-
cut and they returned to New Jersey to live.
Sally, after learning of the Mexican decree, began proceedings to es-
tablish her status as John's legal wife. John answered the complaint by
his first wife declared invalid by a New York court; however, the Second Circuit
adopted a rule of validation to recognize the Mexican divorce for tax purposes and
permit the husband to deduct support payments to his first wife and treat the husband
and his second wife as married), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966). See infra text
accompanying notes 163-68. Declining to follow Borax, the ruling, without explana-
tion, states the Service's position with respect to invalid divorce decrees:
The Internal Revenue Service generally will not question for Federal
income tax purposes the validity of any divorce decree until a court of
competent jurisdiction declares the divorce to be invalid. However, where
a state court, in a proceeding in which there is personal jurisdiction of the
parties or jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, declares the prior
divorce to be invalid, the Service will usually follow the later court deci-
sion rather than the divorce decree for Federal income tax purposes ....
1967-2 C.B. at 66 (emphasis added).
Revenue Ruling 67-442 states that it is a clarification of G.C.M. 25250, but it is
apparent that the Service has abandoned views set forth in the earlier pronouncement.
See Spolter, Invalid Divorce Decrees, 24 TAX L. REV. 163, 174-75 (1969). The Service
has challenged divorces which had not been invalidated and were effected in good faith
and not for tax avoidance, when the revenues were endangered. See Gersten v. Com-
missioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959) (Mexican divorce never declared invalid chal-
lenged to prevent husband and second wife from filing a joint return). If good faith and
tax motivation were the controlling standards, there should be no objection to the result
in Borax; Herman Borax relied in good faith upon the Mexican divorce to subse-
quently marry Hermine and the divorce was not undertaken to reap tax benefits. The
Service's fixation upon the existence of an invalidating decree is also odd in view of the
fact that the Mexican divorce in G.C.M. 25250 was determined to be invalid under
controlling state law. There is no theoretical basis for treating an admittedly invalid
divorce in a different fashion depending upon the existence of a subsequent invalidating
decree.
The Service's position in Revenue Ruling 67-442 is best explained in terms of ad-
ministrative considerations. In the vast majority of situations, the Service does not have
to concern itself with issues relating to marital status; the existence of a divorce decree
is determinative. Yet, at the same time, the Service retains sufficient flexibility to deal
with tax-motivated shifts in marital status. The ruling's stance is also in accord with
the fundamentally sound principle that Congress intended state law to control determi-
nations of marital status. When conflicts arise over marital status, state law should be
controlling to the extent tax principles are not undermined.
,60 38 T.C. 93 (1962).
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charging that Sally's Nevada divorce from her first husband was inva-
lid, which rendered their marriage void. In the state court proceedings,
Sally's complaint was dismissed under the doctrine of unclean hands.
The court determined that John's Mexican divorce was invalid but did
not invalidate Sally's earlier Nevada divorce, although the court ques-
tioned its validity on jurisdictional grounds.
The issue before the Tax Court was whether John could file a joint
return with Sarah and claim an exemption for her. The court analyzed
the state law effect of these events and concluded that New Jersey, the
state of the parties' domicile, continued to recognize the validity of
John's marriage to Sally. Thus, his subsequent marriage to Sarah was
void, which precluded John and Sarah from filing jointly and John
from claiming an exemption for Sarah. 6'
Some courts have been more flexible when an identifiable tax policy
is jeopardized.' In particular, courts have been willing to abandon
state-defined marital status to further the policies underlying the Code's
alimony provisions. In Estate of Borax v. Commissioner,163 the Second
Circuit articulated a rule of validation whereby the court would recog-
nize divorce decrees in determining tax marital status despite the subse-
quent declaration of the decree's invalidity by another jurisdiction. In
Borax, Herman and Ruth Borax were married and had lived together
in New York until 1946, when they separated pursuant to a written
separation agreement. Six years later, Herman obtained a divorce from
Ruth in Chihuahua, Mexico, in a proceeding in which Ruth was not
served and did not appear. A short time later, Herman married
Hermine and they lived together in New York City.
Ruth later filed an action in New York seeking to be declared Her-
"' Id. at 96-97. The court found that John and Sarah living together violated local
law, which precluded Sarah from being John's dependent.
'62 Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965) (Florida divorce declared
invalid by a New York court given effect for tax purposes; husband could deduct pay-
ments to his first two wives and file a joint return with his third wife); Estate of Borax
v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) (Mexican divorce declared invalid by a
New York court recognized for tax purposes; rule of validation tends to further policy
of placing the tax burden of marital settlements upon the recipient), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 935 (1966); Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952) (Florida
divorce declared invalid by a New York court was not a nullity for tax purposes; it is
consistent with the general intent of Congress to permit the husband to deduct pay-
ments pursuant to a separation decree); Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457
(1974) (payments made under a decree declaring a marriage void were deductible ali-
mony; the Code is more concerned with the nature of the payments than with the label
of the action under which the payments are made), acq. 1974-2 C.B. 2.
63 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966).
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man's lawful wife. In that proceeding, the New York court had per-
sonal jurisdiction over Herman and Hermine, who were represented by
counsel and participated in the suit. The court determined that Ruth
was Herman's lawful wife, that Herman and Hermine were not hus-
band and wife, and that the Mexican divorce decree was invalid.
Herman and Hermine's problems had just begun, however. The In-
ternal Revenue Service, relying upon the New York court's determina-
tion as to Ruth's status as Herman's wife, asserted deficiencies against
Herman and Hermine, taking the position that: (1) Herman's pay-
ments to Ruth pursuant to the separation agreement were not deducti-
ble since they were not divorced; 16 4 (2) Herman and Hermine were not
entitled to file jointly since they were not married; and (3) Herman was
not entitled to claim Hermine's children or parents as dependents.
The Second Circuit first considered the tax consequences of the pay-
ments from Herman to Ruth. The court held, for purposes of the rele-
vant federal tax provisions, that Ruth and Herman were divorced; the
subsequent declaration of invalidity of the Mexican decree by New
York had no tax consequences. 65 The court defended the rule of valida-
tion on policy grounds. Recognizing that states may differ in view as to
the validity of a divorce decree, the Second Circuit believed its approach
promoted certainty and uniformity of tax results.'66 In addition, the
court discerned a congressional policy within the Code to place the tax
burden of marital settlement payments upon the party obtaining their
benefits, a policy the Second Circuit viewed as fostered by the rule of
,64 The years in issue were 1952-55 and 1957. Prior to 1954, payments pursuant to
a written separation agreement were not within the Code's alimony provisions. Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, eh. 1, §§ 22(k), 23(u), 56 Stat. 816-17 (current version at
I.R.C. §§ 71, 215). Herman and Ruth had to be divorced under a decree of divorce in
order for Herman to be able to deduct the payments.
'65 The Second Circuit has not limited the rule of validation to divorces obtained in
foreign jurisdictions. In Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965), Har-
old Wondsel married May in 1927 in New York. In 1936, they executed a separation
agreement and in 1937 Harold obtained an ex parte divorce in Florida. Harold later
remarried in Connecticut. In 1941, May obtained a New York judgment affirming that
she was Harold's wife and declaring the Florida divorce null and void. In 1946, Harold
and his second wife separated and Harold again obtained an ex parte Florida divorce.
Shortly thereafter, Harold moved to New Jersey where he married a third time. The
issues before the court were the deductibility of Harold's payments to his first two
wives and whether Harold and his third wife could file a joint return in which the wife
was claimed as a dependent. The Internal Revenue Service took the position that Har-
old's first divorce was invalid so he was still married to his first wife and his subse-
quent marriages and divorces had no tax effect. The Second Circuit, relying on Estate
of Borax, reversed the Tax Court's decision in favor of the Service.
166 349 F.2d at 670.
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validation. The court determined that the statutory requirement that
marital relationships be dissolved by a judicial decree of divorce or sep-
aration does not express any significant tax policy. It found support for
its view in the 1954 amendment to the alimony provisions, which ex-
tended identical tax treatment to support payments made pursuant to a
voluntary written separation agreement. The court reasoned that if a
voluntary separation is sufficient to trigger the relevant tax provisions,
certainly the same tax treatment should result to a couple such as Ruth
and Herman when they cease living together as a marital unit and one
of them obtains a divorce decree, albeit invalid." 7
The court went on to hold that Herman and Hermine were married
for purposes of filing and dependency exemptions, concluding that if
the Mexican divorce was recognized for purposes of characterizing pay-
ments made to Ruth, it would be anomalous not to recognize it for the
purpose of Herman and Hermine's tax returns as husband and wife.168
Thus, the court in Borax adopted a more expansive interpretation of
the concept of divorce which it found consistent with the reality of the
situation and the tax law's revenue purposes. The Second Circuit was
willing to abandon state-defined marital status in order to promote tax
policies which the court viewed as significant.
Courts have also adopted a more flexible approach when dealing
with the tax effects of an annulment. Some courts have avoided "be-
coming mired in the State law distinctions between void and voidable
marriages" 69 by disregarding whether the grounds for the annulment
arose prior to or after the marriage. Instead, these courts have focused
upon the policies underlying sections 71 and 215 and the fact that state
law generally provides for support in annulment actions. For example,
in Newburger v. Commissioner,7' Barbara had instituted a separation
action against Andrew in a New York state court. Andrew counter-
367 Id. at 670-71.
366 Id. at 675-76.
.69 E.g., Laster v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 178, 188 (1967) (periodic payments made
by a husband subsequent to a decree of annulment were gross income to the wife under
§ 71(a)(2) and deductible by him under § 215), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 3. In its earliest
statements concerning the taxability of amounts paid under an annulment decree, the
Service distinguished between causes of action existing at the inception of the marriage
and those arising after the marriage. Special Ruling, Dec. 8, 1944, [19451 4 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 6092; Rev. Rul. 59-130, 1959-1 C.B. 61.
61 T.C. 457 (1974), acq. 1974-2 C.B. 3. Despite its acquiescence in Newburger,
the Service has held that taxpayers must file amended returns as single persons if a
court of competent jurisdiction annuls their marriage in a subsequent taxable year.
Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40 (situation 1).
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claimed for annulment based on the invalidity of a prior divorce ob-
tained by Barbara from her first husband. Andrew's counterclaim was
successful and his marriage to Barbara was declared void at its incep-
tion; thus under state law Barbara and Andrew were never married. In
addition, the New York state court ordered Andrew to make support
payments to Barbara. The issue before the Tax Court was the tax con-
sequences of those payments.
The Tax Court held, despite the annulment decree, that the periodic
payments made by Andrew to Barbara were in recognition of a general
legal obligation, arising out of their marital relationship, and were ali-
mony to Barbara within section 71 and deductible by Andrew under
section 215.'7 The court supported its holding with an examination of
New York state law. Since New York did not distinguish between void
and voidable marriages for purposes of support, the court felt the dis-
tinction should not be made for tax purposes. To do so, the court rea-
soned, would be to ignore the tax statutes' concern with whether the
payments are in the nature of support. Since the putative marriage be-
tween Andrew and Barbara was recognized for purposes of creating a
legal obligation upon Andrew to support Barbara, the court determined
that the relationship should be recognized for tax purposes. Again, the
court abandoned minor distinctions over state-defined marital status in
an effort to further tax policy.
In the absence of legislative action, courts must be willing to abandon
state definitions of marital status when dealing with tax-motivated di-
vorces. The potential for taxpayers to obtain valid year-end divorces
and the weaknesses of the sham analysis require adoption of policy-
based approaches for the determination of tax marital status in these
situations. Courts must, like the courts in Borax and Newburger, disre-
gard state law definitions of marital status when analyzing tax-moti-
vated divorces. Valid temporary divorces and marriages should be dis-
regarded when recognition would undermine discernable tax policy.
" Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. at 460; accord Reisman v. Commissioner,
49 T.C. 570 (1968); Laster v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 178 (1967), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 3;
Reighley v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 344 (1951); Williamson v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. 1189 (1978). Barbara was not required to include the payments in income. In
Newburger v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 219 (1974), the Tax Court held that the
Internal Revenue Service could not retroactively change its published position to tax
Barbara.
However, the Tax Court would most likely not permit Andrew and Barbara to file a
joint return as husband and wife while living together. The court has held that a decree
declaring a marriage void precludes the filing of a joint return. Wilson v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C.M. 1276 (1976); Chap v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. 132 (1964).
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The approach adopted by the Borax court has, however, been widely
criticized.'72 In Lee v. Commissioner,' 7 the Tax Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected application of the rule of valida-
tion when determining whether Harold Lee and his second wife could
file a joint return. The court concluded that state law is determinative
of marital status, and under state law, Harold's Mexican divorce decree
from his first wife was a nullity, invalidating his second marriage and
preventing the filing of a joint return with his second wife. In refusing
to follow Borax, the Tax Court reasoned that Congress did not intend
tax marital status to vary from state law marital status and stated:
Were we to depart from the clearly demarcated path laid down for us
by State law and begin to construct "for-tax-purposes only" marriages and
divorces, we would shortly be faced with insoluble conundrums rooted on
the reality that marital status is in fact a matter of State law. . . . Until
Congress instructs us otherwise, we consider it proper to leave questions of
marital status to State law."'
172 See Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552, 557 (1975) (tax court refused to follow
Borax to the extent it provides that marital status is determined by a "uniform Federal
standard rather than by . . . application of State law"), affd per curiam, 550 F.2d
1201 (9th Cir. 1977); Estate of Steffke v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 530 (1975) (court
refused to extend Borax to an estate tax situation; if there are conflicting judicial de-
crees regarding the validity of a divorce, the decision which would control in the state of
the estate's administration will be followed), afJ'd, 538 F.2d 730 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Wisconsin Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976); Fried,
External Pressures on Internal Revenue: The Effect of State Court Adjudications In
Tax Litigation, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 653-54 (1967) (divorces are not obtained to
affect taxes; state court adjudication on the question of status should be binding if the
court had jurisdiction of the parties); Spolter, supra note 159 (Borax court was preoc-
cupied with uniformity of result and did not adequately analyze the policies of the
various tax provisions); Note, Invalidated Divorce Recognized for Federal Tax Pur-
poses, 18 STAN. L. REV. 750 (1966) (concern over certainty could be satisfied by rely-
ing on the invalidating decree, and Borax is not consistent with the policies of the joint
return privilege). The criticism has not been unanimous. See Note, Divorce, Conflict of
Laws, and the I.R.S., supra note 57.
Even the Second Circuit has given conflicting signals concerning its commitment to
the principles set forth in Borax. In Estate of Spalding v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 666
(2d Cir. 1976), the court applied the rule of validation to hold that an individual was a
"surviving spouse" for purposes of the estate tax marital deduction. However, shortly
after Spalding, in Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1976),
the Second Circuit refused to apply Borax in interpreting the marital deduction provi-
sion when the decree invalidating a prior divorce came from the state in which the
decedent's estate was being administered. For a criticism of Goldwater, see Note, Di-
vorce, Conflict of Laws, and the I.R.S., supra note 57, at 291-93 (arguing that the
Goldwater court ignored the rationale of Borax).
1,3 64 T.C. 552 (1975), affd per curiam, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977).
1 64 T.C. at 558.
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Commentators have also found fault with the Second Circuit's analy-
sis in Borax. It has been suggested that the court overstated the tax
law's interest in Herman and Ruth's marital status since the divorce
was not obtained to affect the imposition of a tax.' 5 Also, the court's
concern for uniformity and certainty has been criticized. It has been
asserted that the court was improperly preoccupied with uniformity of
result and disregarded the substantive legal consequences attaching to
marital status."' Worry over certainty has been termed "needless"
since New York had invalidated the Mexican divorce decree and cer-
tainty could be served by assuming divorces are valid in the absence of
an invalidating decree entitled to full faith and credit."
Writers have also criticized the Borax court's use of tax policy. Tax
concerns may mandate recognition of the invalid Mexican divorce for
purposes of the alimony provisions, but the Second Circuit did not ana-
lyze the tax policies underlying the joint return and dependency provi-
sions with the same depth. It has been suggested that proper analysis
would limit the application of the rule of validation to the alimony pro-
visions; thus Herman Borax would be considered married under certain
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and single under others."8
These arguments are not persuasive in the context of shifts in mari-
tal status undertaken for tax purposes. Congress intended state law
marital status to be controlling for tax purposes, but this principle does
not require recognition of temporary year-end shifts in marital status.
In such a situation, the tax law's interest in the parties' marital status
is paramount and courts should be willing to adopt analytical ap-
proaches which will protect that interest and promote existing tax
policy.
CONCLUSION
The assumptions underlying the role of state-defined marital status
in the tax law have been eroded. These developments require a reeval-
uation of the Code's treatment of marriage which extends beyond the
historical debate over whether to aggregate the income of married
couples. Fundamental changes in the nature of personal relationships
should refocus debate in this area and will have substantial long- and
short-term impact upon the tax law. Additional attention must be di-
"' Fried, supra note 172, at 653-54.
,76 Spolter, supra note 159, at 184-85.
Note, Invalidated Divorce Recognized for Federal Tax Purposes, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 750, 752-53 (1966).
' Spolter, supra note 159, at 186-88.
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rected to distinctions in the Code based upon marital status, and federal
definitions of marital status for tax purposes should be adopted. In the
absence of legislative action, the Service and the courts must act to pre-
vent manipulation of marriage-based tax distinctions and to promote
tax policy.

